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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress believes it has plenary authority to limit the inherent 
power of federal courts to police their own final judgments for fraud 
by a court officer.  Surprisingly, some lower courts agree and have 
recently interpreted a federal statute in a way that restricts 
traditionally inherent judgment-relief powers.1  Both Congress and 
the courts are wrong.  Their error stems from confusion about the 
scope of Article III “judicial power” and the so-called inherent powers 
necessary to support it.2  The resulting ill-considered abrogation of 
federal court power sheds light on broader questions regarding the 
scope of judicial power and Congress’s ability to limit it. 
The propriety of any congressional restriction on a so-called 
inherent power should be analyzed through a two-step framework.3  
First, courts should determine whether the court activity at issue is 
absolutely essential to the exercise of the core, or irreducible nucleus, 
of Article III judicial power.4  If the power is not essential to support 
 
 1  See, e.g., Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
federal courts’ inherent power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court is subject 
to congressional abrogation).  
 2  See Robert J. Pushaw, The Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts and the Structural 
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739–40 (2001) (noting a dearth of legal scholarship 
addressing inherent power and the lack of a comprehensive court-created inherent 
power framework). 
 3  See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 509–512 (1873) (holding that 
regulation of the contempt power may be permissible in circumstances where it does 
not prevent the function of courts). 
 4  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.”). 
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judicial power, Congress has plenary authority to abolish or limit it.  
Second, assuming the activity is essential, courts should determine 
whether the statute restricting it prevents the full exercise of core 
Article III judicial power.5  If so, Congress has exceeded its authority. 
Based on this analysis, several traditional inherent powers are 
beyond Congress’s reach, including the direct contempt power, the 
power to take evidence and develop a factual record, and the power 
to vacate judgments for fraud on the court.  The fraud on the court 
power provides courts with an essential tool to remedy litigation 
wrongs ranging from bribing a federal judge to creating false 
documents or other evidence.6  And while the outer parameters of 
core judicial power are notoriously difficult to locate, some so-called 
inherent powers are plainly not necessary for courts to exercise even 
the most expansive view of the power.  These include the power to 
dismiss cases for forum non conveniens and the power to dismiss cases 
for want of prosecution. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II examines the 
contours and extent of core Article III judicial power and limits on 
Congress’s power to tamper with it.  Both the historical record 
surrounding the adoption of Article III and the doctrinal sources that 
have followed its adoption support an interpretation of “judicial 
power” that plainly protects at least some court activity from 
congressional abrogation or interference.  Part III examines a 
number of other independent court powers implied by Article III’s 
grant of judicial power along with the limits on Congress’s power to 
abridge them.  Finally, Part IV concludes that the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), as interpreted by some lower 
courts, impermissibly interferes with the traditionally inherent power 
to vacate judgments for fraud on the court. 
II.  WHEN CONGRESS CREATES LOWER FEDERAL COURTS, ARTICLE III 
ENDOWS THOSE COURTS WITH IRREDUCIBLE JUDICIAL POWER 
The Constitution created separate, self-executing branches of 
government that work together to embody the full function of the 
sovereign while limiting the undue growth and power of any one 
branch.7  Indeed, Article III established a judiciary that is 
 
 5  See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. at 509–12. 
 6  See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 
(1944) (holding that attorney’s participation in scheme designed to defraud court 
constituted “fraud on the court”).   
 7  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 
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independent from the legislative and executive branches of 
government.8  But the parameters of the new, stand-alone judiciary 
were far from a given when the Framers drafted the Constitution.9  
Courts in England were a function of, and largely subsumed by, the 
executive.10  Although English monarchs and their courts haltingly 
acceded to the principle that even the king is subject to at least some 
law (e.g., the Magna Carta and other charters),11 pre-revolutionary 
colonial courts were a step behind and were viewed by the American 
colonists as merely another tool in the clutches of a tyrannical king.12  
After the Revolution, legislatures dominated the confederate courts 
that preceded the Constitution in an effort to control the perception 
of executive-influenced abuses during the colonial era.13  Legislative 
 
48, at 245–46, 251–52 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (discussing the 
benefits of separate sovereign powers and the potential limits of such separation). 
 8  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 
47, 48, supra note 7, at 245–46, 251–52 (James Madison); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic 
Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 81–82 
(1999) (noting that while the Constitution vests judicial power in the courts, the 
inferior courts depend on Congress, through the tribunals clause, to come into 
existence).  
 9  See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 2, at 822–28; THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 79, 80, 81, 
82, 83, supra note 7, at 391–430 (Alexander Hamilton) (making the case for various 
aspects of the judiciary during ratification). 
 10  See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 206 (7th ed. 1991) 
(noting that the powers of courts were subject to, and derived their existence from, 
the will of the king).  The Glorious Revolution, in 1689, marked a turning point in 
the English court system.  Pushaw, supra note 2, at 806–08.  The monarchy, facing 
demands in parliament, accepted its place as subordinate to at least some laws.  See 
id.  This change was complimented by the Act of Settlement, which provided judges 
with tenure and guaranteed salary.  See id.; see also HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 95. 
 11  See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 807–08. 
 12  Indeed, the Declaration of Independence recites that King George “made 
Judges dependent on his will alone” as one of the grievances animating the 
revolution.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776); see also Pushaw, 
supra note 2, at 819–20. 
 13  Thomas Jefferson wrote about the overbearing post-revolutionary Virginia 
Legislature in Notes on the State of Virginia, observing that by concentrating too much 
power in the hands of one branch—the legislature—Virginia was potentially at the 
hands of a “despotic government.”  THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS: NOTES ON THE 
STATE OF VIRGINIA 245 (Peterson, ed. 1984).  It did not matter, according to Jefferson, 
that power had been disbursed from the executive to the legislative branch because 
“173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one.  Let those who doubt it turn their 
eyes to the republic of Venice.”  Id.  Jefferson went on to observe that the Assembly 
had “in many instances, decided rights which should have been left to judiciary 
controversy.” Id. at 245–46.  In the Federalist, Madison quoted liberally from 
Jefferson’s observations and appended anecdotal examples of legislative 
overreaching from the other former colonies.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 7, 
at 253–54 (James Madison); see also Pushaw, supra note 2, at 820–22.  
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interference created a distinct set of problems.14  Of particular note, 
courts dominated by legislatures tended to act based on political 
expedience, sometimes at the expense of sound legal reasoning or 
doctrinal consistency.15 
While trying to address problems with legislative interference, 
the Framers also attempted to address fears about an unchecked and 
too powerful judiciary.16  Hamilton noted that the same structural 
separation that protects the judiciary from the intrusion of the other 
branches also protects the people from judicial abuse.17  Observing 
that the judiciary would be the “weakest” of the three branches, 
Hamilton wrote that the judiciary “can never attack with success 
either of the other two [branches]; and that all possible care is 
requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.”18  Thus, at 
the time of the framing, the historical record reveals conflicting 
pressures: the pressure to create a judiciary that stood apart from the 
whims of the executive and legislative branches and the competing 
pressure to limit the net power of the judiciary.  These two forces 
arguably resulted in a compromise: an independent but markedly 
weak judicial branch.19 
The limits of the judicial branch are best understood when 
viewed in light of the correlative power of Congress.20  To be sure, 
Article III vests the courts with certain dependent powers.21  For 
 
 14  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 7, at 253–54 (James Madison).  
 15  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 7, at 251 (James Madison) (arguing that 
no branch “ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the 
other[]” branches); cf. JEFFERSON, supra note 13, at 245–46. 
 16  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 7, at 392–93 (James Madison).  
 17  See id. at 392–93, 395. 
 18  See id. at 392. 
 19  Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 7, at 251 (James Madison) (no 
branch “ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the 
other[]” branches) with THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7, at 392 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least 
dangerous [branch] to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least 
in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”). 
 20  See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 222 (1995) (“The Legislature 
would be possessed of power to ‘prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights 
of every citizen are to be regulated,’ but the power of ‘[t]he interpretation of the 
laws’ would be ‘the proper and peculiar province of the courts.’”) (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also Engdahl, 
supra note 8, at 80 (“Intrinsic limits [on congressional power to regulate the judiciary] 
derive from the principle of enumerated powers and the constitutional terms by 
which a particular ‘power’ is conferred.”) (emphasis in original). 
 21  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting Congress the power to create, or not, 
courts from “time to time”). 
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instance, Courts and many scholars agree that the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts is primarily a creature of 
statute, subject to near plenary control by Congress.22  On the other 
hand, Article III also vests lower courts with certain independent, or 
self-executing, powers.23  Often lumped into a broad category called 
“inherent” powers,24 these powers are necessarily implied by Article 
III’s vesting of “judicial power” in “courts.”25  A few commentators 
have nobly ventured into this area and attempted to create a modern, 
cogent taxonomy to accurately categorize the various independent or 
“inherent” powers.26  In a similar vein, and building on the limited 
work in the area, this Article substitutes the term “independent 
power” for “inherent power” to avoid the confusing and 
contradictory lexicon of the courts on the topic and to describe the 
nature of the power more accurately.  Further, the independent 
powers of courts can be further sub-divided into various categories.27  
Along those lines, independent power can be best understood to 
comprise three categories: core Article III judicial power, essential 
 
 22  See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 186–88 (1943); Ex parte McCardle, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: 
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER ch. 1 (2d ed. 1989); William R. 
Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control over Federal 
Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 89, 96 (1990) (rejecting Professor Amar’s two-tier, 
mandatory theory of Article III jurisdiction but acknowledging “vague” but real limits 
on Congress’s power to interfere with the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction); John 
Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of 
Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 255 (1997) (the “Constitution might . . . give[] 
Congress substantial discretion over the actual jurisdiction of the federal courts”); 
Michael Lewis Wells, Congress’s Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 469 (1991) (“Except [in limited] cases . . . the Court has never 
challenged Congress’s paramount authority over jurisdictional doctrine.”).  But see 
Akhil Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 206 (1985) (contending that Article III confers 
mandatory jurisdiction over several categories of cases, including federal questions). 
 23  Some of these independent powers are express, most notably the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction.   
 24  Judges use the term “inherent” power to describe several distinct powers that 
are analytically distinct and subject to varying amounts of Congressional 
interference.  See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847. 
 25  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 26  See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847–48 (describing inherent power as 
comprising “core ‘judicial power,’” “implied indispensable power,” and “beneficial 
powers”); Engdahl, supra note 8, at 85–86 (describing various aspects of inherent 
power as “judicial potency”); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional 
Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 775–80 (describing 
both legitimate and illegitimate “strong” along with “weak” inherent power).  
 27  See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847. 
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independent power, and non-essential independent power.28  These 
distinctions are more than just semantic because it turns out 
Congress’s constitutional ability to regulate core Article III judicial 
power and essential non-core judicial power is substantially limited 
when compared with its ability to regulate non-essential independent 
power.29 
A. Features of Federal “Judicial Power” 
Article III vests the “judicial power” to decide cases and 
controversies in one Supreme Court and in “inferior courts”30 but, 
along with the Tribunals Clause in Article I,31 gives Congress the 
power to establish the inferior courts “from time to time.”32  
Consistent with this language, it is generally accepted that Congress 
has the power to control the structure, size, and organization of the 
federal courts.33  Likewise, most courts and scholars agree that 
Congress has both the power to endow federal courts with subject 
matter jurisdiction34 and near plenary power to rearrange or divest 
the subject matter jurisdiction of a particular court or set of courts.35  
Both of these powers—the existence and structure of the inferior 
courts and their power to entertain disputes—are dependent upon 
congressional action.36 
Once Congress acts to create “courts” (or “tribunals”) and vest 
them with the power to hear certain classes of disputes, however, 
Article III provides courts with independent core judicial power to 
decide particular cases or controversies without any further action 
from Congress.37  The term “judicial power” is not defined in the 
Constitution and, indeed, was not added until late in the drafting 
 
 28  See, e.g., Ryan supra note 26, at 783–84. 
 29  Cf. Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847–48. 
 30  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 31  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 32  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 33  See, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (“Congress [has] 
constitutional authority to establish from time to time such inferior tribunals as they 
may think proper.”); Wells, supra note 22, at 469. 
 34  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 35  See, e.g., Wells, supra note 22, at 465–67.  
 36  See Engdahl, supra note 8, at 83 (noting that certain aspects of Article III 
judicial power are not self-executing). 
 37  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
218 (1995).  Cf. Engdahl, supra note 8, at 84–85 (stating that at least some judicial 
functions “are so integral that power over them must inhere in a body in order for it 
to be called ‘judicial’”). 
BENHAM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  2:35 PM 
82 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:75 
 
process.38  As a result, there is no discussion of the term in the records 
of the Constitutional Convention.39  But Madison and Hamilton 
discussed the role of the courts, and by implication, judicial power, in 
the constitutional system during the ratification era.40 And the 
Supreme Court, from its earliest days, has weighed in on the proper 
function of courts exercising the judicial power vested by Article III.41 
The judicial power encompasses the power to interpret the law.42  
The Constitution does not expressly address the role of the courts in 
legal interpretation, but the earliest historical and doctrinal sources 
do.43  In 1788, writing in support of the Constitution, Hamilton 
famously observed that “the interpretation of the laws is peculiarly 
within the province of courts.”44  Little more than a decade later, 
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Marbury, adopted the 
principle, noting that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”45 
It is important to note that legal interpretation is not exclusively 
the province of the courts.  When crafting legislation, Congress 
assesses the impact that the proposed law will have on existing law as 
well as whether the legislation is constitutional.  Moreover, the 
executive branch continually interprets the law when enforcing it.  
For example, federal prosecutors decide whether probable cause 
exists to charge an individual with federal crimes.  This process 
necessarily involves legal interpretation and is contemplated by the 
Constitution’s shared power scheme. The difference between the 
interpretive role played by the executive and legislative branches and 
the interpretive role assigned to the courts by Article III is largely 
defined by the context in which courts interpret and define law. 
The power to interpret and prescribe the law is limited to the 
context of deciding particular “cases” and “controversies.”46  Although 
the Constitution is silent on precisely what a case or controversy is, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted Article III, section 2 to preclude 
 
 38  See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 26, at 767. 
 39  See id. at 768. 
 40  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton); 
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48, supra note 7, at 245–46, 251–52 (James Madison).  
 41  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 42  See id.   
 43  Compare id. with THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7, at 394 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
 44  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 45  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.  
 46  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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advisory opinions.47  A few years after the Constitution was adopted, 
President Washington and his Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, 
were facing vexing legal questions related to the war between France 
and England.48  Questions about the United States’ ability to remain 
neutral in the war were at issue because of several treaties between 
the countries and federal law.49 
Seeking to resolve these questions, Jefferson sent a letter to the 
Supreme Court on behalf of President Washington.50  The letter 
sought the Supreme Court’s legal opinion on whether it would be 
willing to give advice to the President on legal questions related to 
the construction of treaties and laws of the United States.51  The 
Supreme Court wrote back to Jefferson, declining to answer the 
questions based on separation of powers concerns.52  To provide 
advisory opinions on the questions, the Court announced, would be 
to decide them “extrajudicially.”53  Ever since, the Court has 
consistently held that federal courts cannot decide legal questions 
outside of the context of an actual dispute between parties.54  When a 
federal court does decide a legal question in the context of a case or 
controversy, however, its judgment is final, binding, and not subject 
to the review of the other branches.55 
The decision of a particular case or controversy is subject to 
review only by a superior court in the Article III hierarchy.56  In 
Hayburn’s Case, the Supreme Court rejected a statute that allowed 
federal courts to review veterans’ pension claims and also vested the 
executive branch with the power to review the courts’ decisions.57  
The law violated separation of powers concerns by subjecting the 
 
 47  See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (“‘the honest and actual 
antagonistic assertion of rights’ to be adjudicated [is] . . . indispensable” to federal 
court adjudication).  
 48  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice John Jay (1793), reprinted in 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 50–51 (6th ed. 2009).  
 49  See id. 
 50  See id. 
 51  See id. 
 52  See Correspondence of the Justices to Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in FALLON, 
supra note 48, at 51–52. 
 53  See id. at 52. 
 54  See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943); see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 52–53 (4th ed. 2011). 
 55  See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409–11 (1792). 
 56  See id.; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (holding 
that Congress cannot overturn final judgments of Article III courts). 
 57  See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. at 409–11. 
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final judgments of federal courts to review by a political branch.58  
The judicial power includes the power of appellate review and, 
according to the Court, is vested solely in “courts” by Article III. 
In recent decades, the Court has had the opportunity to reaffirm 
the exclusive role of courts in exercising Article III judicial power.  In 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the Court struck down a law of Congress 
that reinstated securities claims that were dismissed as the result of a 
previous Supreme Court decision.59  The Court held that the statute 
at issue in Plaut violated imperative separation of powers principles by 
subjecting final, dispositive court judgments to review by the 
legislative branch.60  Expressly describing the nature of judicial power 
for the majority, Justice Scalia wrote: 
The record of history shows that the Framers crafted 
[Article III] with an expressed understanding that it gives 
the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, 
but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts 
in the Article III hierarchy—with an understanding, in 
short, that “a judgment conclusively resolves the case” 
because “a ‘judicial Power’ is one to render dispositive 
judgments.”61 
Thus, Article III judicial power is, at the least, the power to decide 
particular cases or controversies in the form of a final, dispositive 
judgment, “subject to review only by [a] superior court[] in the 
Article III hierarchy.”62  This formulation, however, begs the question 
of what it means to decide in the context of judicial power. 
In the context of Article III, deciding a case means resolving it 
on the basis of legal reasons, not political or extra-legal reasons.  
Indeed, while promoting ratification of the Constitution, Hamilton 
noted that independence from the Legislature, and the political 
baggage that comes with it, was necessary in an effective court.63  
Separation from the Legislature was paramount because it protected 
the decisions of particular cases from political will or extra-legal 
bias.64  Courts, by Hamilton’s view, were to decide cases based on legal 
 
 58  See id. at 410–11. 
 59  Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217–19.  
 60  See id. 
 61  Id. at 218–19 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990)). 
 62  See id. 
 63  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7, at 393–96 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 64  See id. at 393 (“The complete independence of the courts of justice is 
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”). 
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reasons.65 
The power to adjudicate cases based on legal reasons is so 
central to the “judicial power” that it might even be referred to as an 
existential requirement.  Without the independent power to decide 
the merits of a particular case,66 Hamilton found the appointment of 
a judiciary, apart from the Legislature, a futile exercise: 
The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they 
should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of 
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the 
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.  
The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that 
there ought to be no judges distinct from [the 
Legislature].67 
The power to decide cases based on legal reasons implies the 
related power to decide them impartially.68  Madison responded to 
concerns that the national judiciary would subsume state interests by 
noting that “[t]he decision [of a particular case] is to be impartially 
made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual 
and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality.”69  
Pure legal reasoning in the disputed case context is by its nature 
impartial because, at its essence, legal reasoning is the logical 
application of general principles to specific facts. 
Inappropriate bias, or partiality, in a court proceeding may stem 
from an extra-legal source, like the self-interest of the decision 
maker, personal prejudice, or favoritism.70  Of course, the 
fundamental requirement that courts have the power to decide cases 
based on legal reasons does not necessarily imply that they will always 
execute this power perfectly, or at all.  But Article III protects their 
 
 65  See id. at 395 (noting that what properly separates the judiciary function from 
the legislative is the pure use of “judgment” (i.e., a conclusion based on the law) over 
the “will”). 
 66  Hamilton’s discussion in the Federalist No. 78 highlights the judiciary’s role in 
assessing the constitutionality of statutes and rendering judgment on their validity 
based upon the law—i.e., the Constitution.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7, at 
393–95 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 67  Id. at 395; see also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: 
The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 696, 769 (1998).  
 68  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 7, at 197 (James Madison). 
 69  Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
 70  The independent nature of the core adjudicatory function is also confirmed 
by the lifetime tenure and pay requirements of Article III.  The “judges” of both the 
Supreme and inferior “Courts . . . shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour” 
and without a reduction in pay during their time in office.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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ability to do so from the interference of the other branches.71 
B. The Constitution Does Not Grant Congress the Power to Abridge the 
Full Exercise of Judicial Power 
Once Congress creates lower courts and vests them with 
jurisdiction to hear particular disputes, those courts have 
independent judicial power in the particular cases they are 
empowered to hear.72  Congress cannot reduce the core 
characteristics of this power in particular cases.  The reason is 
straightforward: the Constitution enumerates the powers of each 
branch, and the Constitution simply does not provide Congress the 
power to abrogate, change, or interfere with judicial power.  The 
utter lack of any enumerated constitutional power to tamper with 
core judicial power arguably reflects the Framers’ desire to protect 
the independent power of the judiciary from the other branches.73 
This is not to say that Congress has no power over the judiciary.  
The Constitution provides Congress near total authority over the 
structure and jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.  The express 
legislative power that Congress does possess over the judiciary flows 
from two main sources: the clauses dealing with the creation of 
tribunals in both Article III and Article I,74 and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.75  None of these constitutional provisions provide 
 
 71  See id.  Indeed, if Congress could insert itself into the resolution of every 
aspect of the case-by-case dispute resolution delegated to the judiciary, it could even 
resolve doubts about the constitutionality of its own statutes in favor of itself, despite 
legal reasons to the contrary.  In such a system, judicial review of Congressional 
action would be nothing more than a toothless “constitutional charade.”  Lawrence 
G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2528 (1998).  
 72  Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995); see also 
Engdahl, supra note 8, at 83–84 (noting, however, that the notion of “judicial 
potency” or independent judicial power is complicated by Congress’s role in vesting 
courts with subject matter jurisdiction in the first place). 
 73  Professor David Engdahl, arguing for an expansive version of inherent power 
and irreducible judicial power, contends that the lack of enumerated congressional 
power to restrict judicial power implies that Congress’s ability to regulate the courts’ 
subject matter jurisdiction and powers is more limited than most courts and 
commentators acknowledge.  See Engdahl, supra note 8, at 91–93.  But see Wells, supra 
note 22, at 468–69 (observing the Court’s reluctance to challenge Congress’s power 
to regulate jurisdiction and most other court powers).  
 74  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (stating that Congress can constitute tribunals); 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that Congress may establish inferior courts from 
“time to time”). 
 75  Despite nearly a century of debate between scholars about whether the Rules 
Enabling Act is an unconstitutional intrusion into the judiciary’s rulemaking 
prerogatives, the Supreme Court has not questioned its constitutionality for decades.  
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Congress with the express power to circumscribe Article III judicial 
power once operative in a court. 
Neither of the clauses addressing the creation of inferior 
tribunals grants Congress the power to abrogate core judicial power.76  
Article III vests judicial power in “one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”77  Article I grants Congress the correlative power “[t]o 
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme [C]ourt.”78  These 
clauses have been read together to mean that the “tribunals” that 
Congress was empowered to create were “courts” endowed with 
“judicial power.”79  The Constitution describes Congress’s power to 
constitute tribunals in exclusive terms.  This precludes its ability to 
form or reform courts into entities without judicial power because 
the Constitution simply does not provide Congress the enumerated 
or implied power to do so.80 
This is curious considering Congress’s plenary power to destroy 
the tribunals it creates—the so-called “necessary implication” flowing 
from the power Congress has to create them in the first place.81  But it 
does make sense: Congress can create and destroy “courts” vested 
with judicial power under Article III, but the power to destroy those 
courts does not confer a power to create or reform a court into an 
entity other than a court vested with judicial power.82  Thus, while the 
Constitution gives Congress plenary power to create or abolish 
entities inferior to the Supreme Court, the Constitution, having 
vested the courts with core judicial power, specifies certain minimum 
features that must inhere in any Article III courts that Congress 
chooses to create.83 
 
See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464–65 (1965).  Notwithstanding sweeping 
congressional power over the structure, jurisdiction, and processes of courts, 
however, some powers still remain exclusively within the province of the judiciary. 
 76  See Engdahl, supra note 8, at 100–07, 118. 
 77  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 78  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 79  See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 8, at 81–84. 
 80  See id. at 117–19.   
 81  See REDISH, supra note 22, at 29 (“It has generally been assumed that since 
Congress need not have created lower federal courts in the first place, it can abolish 
them once they have been created.”).  
 82  Professor Redish notes that it has also been assumed that the power to destroy 
the lower federal courts also implies the lesser power to restrict their jurisdiction.  See 
id. at 29 (citing Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850)).  But see Amar, supra 
note 22, at 206. 
 83  See REDISH, supra note 22, at 8 (“Although the Constitution gives Congress 
discretion to create lower federal courts, it mandates that if inferior federal courts 
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Accordingly, the terms “judicial power,” “court,” and “tribunal” 
as used in both Article I and Article III are more than simply 
descriptive.  They are also limiting.  If Congress chooses to create 
inferior courts, those entities must indeed be capable of hearing cases 
and controversies between litigants and rendering final judgments 
based on legal reasoning—the essence of judicial power.84  Likewise, 
if Congress chooses to eliminate inferior courts, it must totally 
eliminate the existence of the court.  But it cannot reform the court 
into an entity without the key features of judicial power described by 
Article III.85  Otherwise, Congress has exceeded its powers.86 
Congress has long relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
justify its regulation of lower court practices.87  But, like the Tribunals 
Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not provide a means 
for Congress to frustrate or eliminate the judiciary’s core powers 
either.88  Indeed, the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to 
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”89  Accordingly, Congress may make all laws that carry into 
 
are created, they must have certain attributes.”). 
 84  Liebman and Ryan, who attempt to track Madison’s view of judicial power, 
describe the power that attaches to any Article III court: 
“[T]he judicial power” means the Article III judge’s authority and 
obligation, in all matters over which jurisdiction is conferred, 
independently, finally, and effectually to decide the whole case and 
nothing but the case on the basis, and so as to maintain the supremacy, 
of the whole federal law. 
See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 67, at 771.  This approach includes both a subject 
matter aspect and a qualitative aspect.  Only certain cases are within the Article III 
courts’ purview, but those cases must be decided according to certain principles 
consistent with the judicial power that Congress vests in them.  See REDISH, supra note 
22, at 8. 
 85  The Supreme Court has held that, in ordinary circumstances, Congress 
cannot overturn final judgments through legislation.  Doing so violates separation of 
powers principles.  See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995). 
 86  Cf. Engdahl, supra note 8, at 104, 106–07 (describing the “[s]pecious 
‘[n]ecessary [i]mplication’ of the ‘[t]ribunals [c]lause.’”). 
 87  See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838). 
 88  Professor David Engdahl examines the intrinsic limits of Congress’s power to 
regulate the judiciary through an examination of several provisions of the 
Constitution.  See Engdahl, supra note 8, at 81–83.  His position on the indefeasible 
features of courts is sweeping and includes certain irreducible jurisdictional features.  
Id. at 138.  This Article does not take a position on the intrinsic constitutional limits 
of Congress’s power to regulate jurisdiction, rather it addresses the question of what 
features of judicial power are irreducible once jurisdiction attaches.  
 89  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). 
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execution Article III judicial power.90 
As discussed above, that power, at the least, includes the ability 
to create entities and vest them with jurisdiction to decide disputed 
cases and render final judgments based on legal reasons in addition 
to prescribing court practices and procedures.  On the other hand, 
any enactment of Congress that thwarts the execution of the exercise 
of judicial power in properly vested courts cannot flow from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause because thwarting the judicial power 
cannot be said to “carry[] [it] into Execution.”91 
Congress cannot abridge courts’ power to render final, binding 
judgments in cases and controversies over which courts have 
jurisdiction.  The modern Supreme Court, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 
Inc., rebuffed an attempt by Congress to overturn a case that 
dismissed late-filed securities actions.92  The Court, in a previous 
ruling, held that § 10(b) securities actions had to be filed within 
three years of the alleged violation of securities laws and within one 
year of the discovery of the violation.93  Congress responded with a 
statute reinstating all dismissed securities fraud cases filed before the 
decision that would have been considered timely but for the Court’s 
decision.94  Effectively, Congress attempted to overturn the Supreme 
Court’s decision, abridging its power to render a final, binding 
judgment.95  Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia noted that Article III 
courts have the power “not merely to rule on cases, but to decide 
them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III 
hierarchy . . . .  [The] ‘judicial Power’ is one to render dispositive 
 
 90  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 432 (1793) (a law prescribing 
the means and mode of service raised a case “in which an article of the Constitution 
cannot be effectuated without the intervention of the Legislative authority.”  Indeed, 
“[beyond the enumerated powers] is this general one: ‘To make all laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all 
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or 
in any department or officer thereof.’”); see also Engdahl, supra note 8, at 103; cf. 
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838) (“[C]ongress 
exercised [its] power, so far as [it] thought it necessary and proper, under the 
seventeenth clause of the eighth section, first article, for carrying into execution the 
powers vested by the [C]onstitution in the judicial [department]”); Ex parte Royall, 
117 U.S. 241, 249 (1886).  
 91  Engdahl, supra note 8, at 103 (stating that “the Necessary and Proper Clause 
‘operates like a one-way ratchet,’” and laws that “diminish, curtail, or interfere” with 
the judicial power are not authorized by the clause). 
 92  514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995). 
 93  See id. at 213 (citing Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991)). 
 94  See id. at 214–15. 
 95  See id. at 214–15, 240. 
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judgments.”96 
According to this reasoning, Congress cannot force courts to 
hear cases contrary to a final, binding judgment dismissing them.97  
The power to bind litigants through a judgment and to revise 
judgments is an exclusive judicial prerogative. 
At a minimum then, core Article III judicial power is the power 
to decide individual disputes on the basis of impartial legal reasoning 
by rendering a final, dispositive judgment based on that reasoning.  
This power is irreducible.98  Some commentators have suggested a 
more expansive view of core judicial power and other Article III 
provisions that would further restrict congressional action, including 
limiting Congress’s power to strip jurisdiction.99  This Article does not 
weigh in on that debate and proceeds, arguendo, utilizing the minimal 
and indisputable characterization of core judicial power above. 
III. ARTICLE III’S GRANT OF CORE JUDICIAL POWER IMPLIES OTHER 
INDEPENDENT COURT POWERS THAT SUPPORT THE EXERCISE OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 
Beyond the nucleus, or core, of judicial power that must inhere 
in any federal tribunal, courts have long recognized other 
independent or inherent powers necessary or helpful in effectuating 
the judicial power.  These powers comprise two categories: essential 
independent power and non-essential independent court power.100  
Congress may not prevent the full exercise of Article III judicial 
power by regulating essential independent power.  And while courts 
may exercise non-essential independent, or beneficial, powers 
without congressional authorization, Congress has full authority to 
limit or eliminate these powers. 
 
 96  Id. at 218–19 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990)); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 328 (2000) 
(“The Constitution prohibits one branch of the Government from encroaching on 
the central prerogatives of another.  Article III gives the Federal Judiciary the power, 
not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior 
Article III courts.”).  
 97  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, at 166. 
 98  Cf. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218–19. 
 99  See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 8, at 103–04; Amar, supra note 22, at 206–07. 
 100  Cf. Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847–48. 
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A. Congress May Not Prevent the Full Exercise of Judicial Power by 
Regulating or Eliminating Independent Court Powers Necessary for 
the Exercise of Judicial Power 
Core judicial power would be an empty power if courts did not 
have certain ancillary powers necessary to fulfill the courts’ core 
function.  Accordingly, courts have recognized a category of 
independent power that might be most aptly described as essential.101  
Core judicial power is the constitutionally recognized minimal ability 
to decide disputed cases on the basis of legal reasons in the form of a 
final judgment.102  This power flows from the Constitution and, like 
any other constitutional power, may be exercised fully—absent some 
other constitutional limitation.  By way of comparison, take the 
pardon power.  The Constitution empowers the President to pardon 
criminals.103  Congress cannot reduce this power by, for example, 
allowing the President to pardon only certain crimes, or pardon on 
certain days, or only grant clemency instead of full pardons.104  Doing 
so would encroach on the President’s constitutional prerogative.105  
Likewise, Congress cannot reduce the judicial power in particular 
cases once Congress has vested it in the lower federal courts either by 
wholly preventing its exercise or reducing it. 
But there are many roads Congress could potentially take, some 
of them not so obvious, leading to the abrogation or reduction of the 
Article III judicial power.  This is because many necessary or 
“indispensable” steps lie between the initiation of a disputed case and 
a final judgment.106  Complaints are filed, lawsuits proceed through 
the pre-trial adjudication process to trial, and ultimately, after trial or 
settlement, terminate in the form of a final judgment.  If Congress 
undermined the parts of this process that are essential to deciding 
cases based on legal reasons, it would indirectly gain plenary control 
 
 101  Professor Robert J. Pushaw Jr., describing these powers as “implied 
indispensable” powers, argues that “courts can infer a power only if they would 
otherwise be unable to perform their express constitutional functions competently.”  
Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847. 
 102  See supra Part II.A. 
 103  U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 104  Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 334 (1866) (“The power of pardon 
conferred by the Constitution upon the President is unlimited except in cases of 
impeachment.  It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at 
any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during 
their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.  The power is not subject to 
legislative control.”). 
 105  See id. 
 106  See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847. 
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over the judicial power vested in Article III courts.107  This is no more 
permissible than a law directly preventing courts from issuing final 
judgments in cases over which they have jurisdiction or otherwise 
interfering with Article III judicial power.  Thus, Congress’s ability to 
regulate essential, independent powers is limited. 
The framework for determining the validity of an act of 
Congress that regulates an essential independent power proceeds in 
two steps.108  First, courts should determine whether the power is 
essential to the exercise of Article III judicial power.  By “essential,” 
this Article contends that if the power did not exist, courts would not 
enjoy the ability to fully exercise Article III judicial power in a case 
over which Congress has vested them with jurisdiction.109  Second, 
assuming that the independent power asserted by the courts is indeed 
essential, a congressional action regulating it is invalid if it eliminates 
or restricts the full exercise of the power.110  Some courts and 
commentators have referred to this as “material” or “serious” 
impairment.111 
 
 107  If Congress cannot instruct a court on how to decide a case directly, it follows 
that Congress cannot accomplish the same end indirectly by limiting or controlling 
the means with which courts decide cases.  Cf. REDISH, supra note 22, at 47–48 
(instructing courts “how to decide” cases is not a part of Congress’s authority).  
 108  See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847 for a well-reasoned analytical framework to 
assess the propriety of courts’ exercise of what he terms “implied indispensable 
powers.”  As a correlative principle, Pushaw argues that “[b]ecause the Constitution 
grants federal judges implied indispensable powers, it surely does not authorize 
Congress to destroy or impair them.”  Id. at 848.  This Article agrees with the latter 
limiting principle, but disagrees with the former for reasons discussed below. 
 109  Cf. Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847–48 (noting that “[b]ecause the Constitution 
grants federal judges implied indispensable powers, it surely does not authorize 
Congress to destroy or impair them”). 
 110   As discussed, supra, in Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, 
Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., the Court considered whether a statute “materially 
interfere[d]” with the contempt power.  Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., St. 
Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924).  Although the Court 
ultimately held that extending the jury trial right to criminal contempt in certain 
cases did not materially interfere with the power, the proposition that a valid law may 
not “materially” interfere with, or impair, an essential power is sound.  “Material” 
roughly means meaningful, or bearing some logical connection with facts or result.  
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (9th ed. 2009) (material means “[h]aving some 
logical connection with the consequential facts”). 
 111  See e.g., Pushaw, supra note 2, at 833, 847–48.  This principle relates to step one 
of the analysis but is distinct.  If Congress cannot constitutionally pass laws that 
reduce core judicial power, step one is a gatekeeper that validates any congressional 
action with respect to an “inherent” power disconnected from core judicial power.  
Step two determines if congressional action touching a power necessary to the 
exercise of core judicial power merely regulates the essential power or, instead, 
impermissibly reduces core judicial power indirectly.  Cf., e.g., Pushaw, supra note 2, 
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Professor Pushaw employs a similar test, which he labels as “strict 
necessity,” to describe both the test for whether a court can exercise 
an independent power in the first place and whether Congress can 
restrict a power so exercised.112  While this Article adopts part of his 
well-reasoned framework (Congress cannot eliminate or abrogate 
powers that are necessary for the exercise of Article III power), it 
rejects the contention that a power must be indispensable before a 
court can exercise it.113 
For Pushaw, along with Professor Van Alstyne, courts can 
exercise a non-core power independently (i.e., without congressional 
authorization) only if the power is essential, or strictly necessary to 
the exercise of judicial power.114  But courts plainly exercise non-
essential (or “beneficial”) powers on a daily basis without 
congressional authorization.115  Thus, by conflating the analysis of 
whether a court can act absent congressional authorization with the 
question of whether Congress can prevent a court from acting, 
Pushaw’s analysis tempts courts to describe inherent powers as 
indispensable when they really are not.116  This creates the real risk 
that courts will later resist congressional regulation of putatively 
indispensable powers because they have previously been described as 
indispensable or “strictly necessary.”117  Thus, this Article adopts a 
 
at 847–48. 
 112  Pushaw describes the strict necessity test as allowing courts to “infer a power 
only if they would otherwise be unable to perform their express constitutional 
functions competently.”  Id. at 847 (emphasis added).  The competent exercise of 
judicial power may, in many cases, be coextensive with the ability to fully exercise 
judicial power.  For instance, either a court has the ability to render a final, binding 
judgment or it does not.  A law preventing a court from rendering judgment in a 
case that is otherwise properly before it would prevent both the full and competent 
exercise of judicial powers.  In other instances, competent exercise of judicial power 
might amount to something less than full exercise.  In those cases, courts have the 
ability to exercise Article III judicial power fully. 
 113  Contra Pushaw, supra note 2, at 843, 847–48. 
 114  Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847–48; see also William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of 
Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A 
Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 
129 (1976).   
 115  See Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 311, 313–15 (2010) (describing the widespread use of inherent power in the 
modern rules system). 
 116  The use of inherent powers is widespread in courts, both historical and 
modern.  See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 760–82 (cataloguing inherent powers 
precedent); Jordan, supra note 115, at 313–15 (acknowledging the same).  
 117  This is not to suggest that all court resistance to inherent powers regulation is 
impermissible.  Indeed, separation of powers concerns mandate that courts do so in 
some instances.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of 
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framework that acknowledges the reality that courts often utilize non-
essential power in a gap-filling role while preserving Congress’s ability 
to prohibit it.  Accordingly, if a putative essential court power is not 
actually essential, Congress has plenary authority to regulate or 
abolish it.  But where it is helpful to do so, courts may fill the gaps in 
prescribed procedures in the meantime. 
Throughout history, essential powers have arisen in three 
principle areas.118  First, courts have the essential power to maintain 
functionality by mandating both decorum and compliance with court 
orders.119  Second, courts have the essential power to develop an 
accurate and impartial factual record.120  Third, courts have the 
essential power to control their dockets.121 
The contempt power is a good example of the first category of 
essential independent power and also a good example of how the 
framework for independent powers operates.122  Although the 
contours of the contempt power have always been defined through a 
system of regulation shared by Congress and courts, Congress cannot 
eliminate the contempt power.123  The Judiciary Act of 1789 
recognized the contempt power but did little to regulate or control 
it.124  In response to perceived judicial abuse of the broad contempt 
 
Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1688 (2004) (arguing that a limited number 
of inherent powers are beyond congressional regulation as a matter of separation of 
powers). 
 118  Professor Pushaw contends that indispensable powers may arise through 
either Article III’s “judicial power” language or its creation of “courts.”  See Pushaw, 
supra note 2, at 847.  This is likely true because the term “court” implies certain 
necessary characteristics in any court Congress chooses to create.  In most cases, 
however, any central attributes of “courts” are embodied in the concept of core 
judicial power.  For instance, Professor Pushaw suggests that being a “court” means 
having the ability to regulate internal administrative affairs.  Id.  The power to do this 
is also likely to be essential to the adjudicatory function described by “judicial 
power.”  Authority is difficult to find, however, for the further conclusion that 
Congress cannot abrogate “court” powers unrelated to adjudication.  But see id. at 848 
(arguing that “essential ‘court’ power may be exercised regardless of whether 
adjudication has been affected.”). 
 119  See Michaelson v. U. S. ex rel. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis. & Omaha. Ry. Co., 
266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (noting that Congress may regulate, but not eliminate, the 
contempt power). 
 120  See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847 (“[A]djudication requires impartial, relevant, 
and consistent fact finding.”).   
 121  See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706–07 (1997) (noting that a court has 
“broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own 
docket” but also observing that this power is not without limits). 
 122  See Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66. 
 123  See id. 
 124  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789), invalidated on other 
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power set out in 1789, Congress passed a statute limiting the 
contempt power in 1831.125 
While this statute has survived as a permissible regulation, rather 
than elimination or impermissible impairment, of the contempt 
power, the Court has since recognized that this power is “essential to 
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings.”126  Indeed, in Ex 
Parte Robinson, the Court observed that “[t]he moment the courts of 
the United States were called into existence and invested with 
jurisdiction over any subject” they attained the contempt power.127  In 
Robinson, a court disbarred an attorney for refusing to obey a court 
order.128  The Supreme Court overturned this use of the power, 
however, because Congress “limited and defined” contempt in the 
1789 Act (and again in the 1831 Act) to be punishable by fine or 
imprisonment, not disbarment.129  Robinson sets up an analytical 
framework that survives to this day: Congress may limit or regulate 
the contempt power, but it may not eliminate or impair the power in 
a way that prevents the full exercise of core judicial power.130  By 
exclusively allowing for fine and imprisonment as punishment, 
Congress limited the contempt power.  But this limitation did not 
eliminate the contempt power’s ability to protect the day-to-day 
functions of courts. 
The contempt power, however, has long been subject to 
criticism that it is easily abused, and drawing the lines between 
permissible regulation and material impairment can be difficult.131  
 
grounds by Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 125  The 1831 Act limited contempt to misconduct in the court’s presence (or 
close enough to hamper the court’s function); disobedience or resistance of a lawful 
order, process, rule, decree, writ, or command; and misbehavior by court officers in 
their official transactions.  Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, 488 (1831) 
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2006)).  
 126  Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873). 
 127  Id.  Cf. REDISH, supra note 22, at 8–9 (noting that certain attributes, including 
independence from other branches, inhere in any courts Congress chooses to 
create).  
 128  See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. at 509–10. 
 129  See id. at 512.  The Court even insinuated that the contempt power of the lower 
courts might be subject to plenary congressional regulation, a position it would 
retreat from a few decades later in Michaelson.  See Michaelson v. U.S. ex rel. Chi., St. 
Paul, Minneapolis. & Omaha. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924).  
 130  See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress in Criminal Contempts 
in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1022 
(1924) (arguing that inherent contempt power emanates “solely to the fact that a 
court has business in hand and must get on with it”). 
 131  See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 770 n.171 for a discussion of several notable 
examples of judicial exploitation of the contempt power, including In re Debs, 158 
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Perceived abuses of contempt resulted in additional acts of Congress 
regulating the power.132  During the end of the nineteenth century 
and beginning of the twentieth century, courts were criticized for 
abusing the contempt power to punish labor activists, and Congress 
responded with a statute requiring a jury trial for contempt where the 
act underlying the contempt was also a separate criminal offense.133  
The Court sustained this regulation but again observed that courts 
have the contempt power when created and vested with 
jurisdiction.134  And although Congress may regulate the lower courts’ 
contempt powers, the Court noted that the powers “can neither be 
abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative” by an act of 
Congress.135  The Court went on to uphold the statute at issue because 
it did not “materially” impair the lower courts’ contempt powers.136 
The Court’s protection of the contempt power is well founded.  
The contempt power is essential to the exercise of core judicial power 
because it would be impossible to decide at least some cases if courts 
could not punish courtroom misconduct or certain out-of-court 
misconduct. For instance, it is impossible to decide cases if courts 
cannot hold hearings in a case because a litigant stands and shouts 
profanities in the courtroom every time court convenes.  Likewise, it 
would be impossible to decide some cases if witnesses refused to obey 
subpoenas and testify, depriving the court of a factual record upon 
which to base a legal decision.  The contempt power provides a 
mechanism for punishing non-compliance with such subpoenas and 
is thus an essential part of the adjudication process. 
Both statutory and rule-based restrictions, to date, have not 
eliminated or materially impaired the contempt power.137  Congress 
has successfully required juries for certain contempt actions, placed 
 
U.S. 564 (1895), in which the Court upheld contempt sanctions punishing labor 
activists for conspiring to violate railroad laws and Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 
U.S. 307 (1967) in which the Court upheld contempt convictions against Martin 
Luther King, Jr. 
 132  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 402 (2006). 
 133  See id.  
 134  See Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 65–66. 
 137  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 both contemplates the contempt 
power and regulates it.  The rule tracks the traditional contempt power but adds 
additional protections consistent with the Court’s extension of constitutional 
criminal procedure guarantees to contempt cases.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42; see also 
Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 795–801 (1987) (requiring a disinterested 
prosecutor); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 197 (1968) (extending the right to jury 
trial to contempt sanctioned by substantial punishment). 
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restrictions on contempt for those not physically present in court, 
limited contempt to the violation of lawful orders, and regulated both 
the amount of fine and length of imprisonment that courts can 
impose for contemptuous action.138  While these restrictions narrow 
the power, they do not restrict it in a way that prevents the exercise of 
core judicial power.139  To date, imprisonment and fine, even in 
limited amounts, have proven sufficient to encourage compliance 
and decorum in the courts.  Thus, contempt still serves its essential 
function.  If, however, Congress attempted to regulate contempt in a 
way that intruded on the ability of courts to decide cases and 
otherwise exercise Article III judicial power, then the regulation 
would be invalid. 
Courts also have the essential, independent power to develop an 
accurate factual record, a category that comprises several distinct sub-
powers.140  At the outset, the power to develop a factual record is 
essential, in itself, to the exercise of Article III judicial power.  
Indeed, it is impossible to decide cases without a factual record.  
Applying the law to the facts and reaching a result was central to 
adjudication when the Constitution was drafted and ratified and 
remains so today.  If Congress prohibited courts from developing a 
record, they could not decide cases. 
Despite congressional regulation of the subpoena power, the 
power to compel testimony is a necessary sub-part of the power to 
develop an accurate factual record.  Congress has long regulated the 
power to subpoena witnesses and compel testimony.141  But the power 
to compel testimony is essential to fact-finding and, accordingly, 
adjudication; therefore, Congress cannot eliminate or materially 
impair it.142  The power to develop a factual record would be an 
empty one without the power to compel the creation of such a 
 
 138  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (2006). 
 139  See, e.g., Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66–69 (upholding the Clayton Act’s jury trial 
requirement for certain classes of contempt while noting the critical relationship the 
contempt power has with the exercise of judicial power). 
 140  See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847 for a basic discussion of fact finding as a 
necessary part of adjudication.  See also Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of 
Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rulemaking, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 642–44 
(1957) (noting that the court’s ability to find facts is a necessary feature). 
 141  See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a) (providing a mechanism to compel testimony of 
witnesses); 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (2006) (stating that refusal to provide testimony can 
result in summary confinement “until such time as the witness is willing to give such 
testimony or provide such information”).  
 142  See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847 (arguing that the power to compel testimony 
is indispensable). 
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record.  Even if some witnesses testify voluntarily, some witnesses will 
not, making compelled testimony a basis of fact-finding in at least 
some cases. 
Finally, courts have several essential, independent powers to 
regulate and control their own dockets.143  For instance, courts have 
the power to stay cases or continue trial settings.144  This power is 
essential to the exercise of core judicial power because it guarantees 
that the court can meaningfully engage in the judicial function.145 For 
example, if Congress prohibited all continuances and all stays, courts 
with busy dockets would be overwhelmed and not able to adjudicate 
the merits of each case based on legal reasons.  Taken to the 
extreme, cases would be dismissed or otherwise decided based on the 
arbitrary circumstances of the court in which they were filed, namely 
court congestion.  Thus, Congress may not eliminate the power to 
stay and continue cases because doing so would strip some Article III 
courts of the power to decide these cases. 
Congress’s ability to regulate essential independent judicial 
power should always be tested against the impact that the regulation 
will have on Article III judicial power.  Often, history is instructive on 
the contours and limits of essential independent power, but it is not 
binding.  If eliminating or restricting a power does not interfere with 
or eliminate constitutional judicial power—because the allegedly 
essential power is unrelated to Article III judicial power, or exists 
through some other mechanism,  or because the regulation restricts 
the essential power without affecting judicial power—then Congress 
has the power to do so.  Indeed, the third category of independent 
court power—non-essential independent power (sometimes known as 
beneficial or gap-filling power)—is subject to the plenary control of 
Congress. 
B. Congress Has the Plenary Authority to Regulate or Eliminate Non-
Essential Independent Judicial Power 
Courts have recognized other independent powers—powers that 
are helpful or beneficial to their function but not essential to the 
exercise of Article III judicial power.  This category of power is best 
 
 143  See, e.g., Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). 
 144  See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). 
 145  See Landis, 299 U.S. at 254 (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to 
the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its 
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”). 
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described as non-essential independent power.146  Both the 
Constitution and the records of the convention are silent with respect 
to who has the power to prescribe the practices and procedures of 
the federal courts.147  But from the beginning, both Congress and 
courts recognized that Congress has the power to regulate court 
procedures.148  Scholars continue to debate the propriety of the Rules 
Enabling Act (REA), and this Article does not take a position on the 
propriety of the REA.149  Rather, I observe that the REA rulemaking 
scheme continues to develop procedural rules that courts continue to 
follow.150  While the rules are comprehensive, they are not exhaustive.  
To be sure, Congress’s ability to regulate court procedures does not 
 
 146  Commentators have affixed various labels to this category of power.  See Ryan, 
supra note 26, at 776–79 (describing non-essential independent power as the “weak 
version” of inherent power); Pushaw, supra note 2, at 848–49 (discussing the 
“beneficial powers” vested in federal courts); Jordan, supra note 115, at 313–15 
(noting that courts have long employed “inherent” power to fill procedural gaps 
where useful). 
 147  See Ryan, supra note 26, at 767 (“It is common ground that, at the 
Constitutional Convention, the Framers did not address the issue of whether the 
judicial power granted to the federal courts includes the power to establish court 
practices and procedures.”).  But the records of the state ratification conventions, 
however, do contain some slight indications that Congress could prescribe 
procedural rules.  See id. at 776–79 (citing 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 110 
(2d ed. 1866)).  Hamilton also observed that the legislative power “to constitute 
courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial” when arguing that Congress would 
have the power to prescribe jury trials in civil causes.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 
419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 148  See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789) (stating that 
lower courts “have the power to grant new trials,” “impose . . . necessary oaths and 
affirmations,” and punish contempt, provided that lower courts had power to 
“establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business” so long as those 
rules did not conflict with other law), invalidated on other grounds by Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); The Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 
93–94 (1789) (prescribing that federal courts should adopt the procedures of the 
state courts from the state in which the federal courts sat); see also Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) (“Congress 
has . . . undoubted power to prescribe rules for the courts it has created”); Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“For the constitutional provision for a federal 
court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it 
congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those 
courts.”).  
 149  See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 MERCER 
L. REV. 733, 734–35 (1995) (arguing that procedural rulemaking is a uniquely 
judicial function).  But see, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Independence: Constitutional 
and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 724–26 (1995) (arguing that 
rulemaking is well within Congress’s prerogative). 
 150  See, e.g., Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (“Congress has . . . undoubted power to 
prescribe rules for the courts it has created.”). 
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translate into an actual rule on every conceivable procedural 
matter.151  As a result, gaps exist.  And courts have consistently 
recognized their authority to fill gaps to maintain efficient and 
effective operation.152 
Some commentators argue that courts should exercise 
independent powers only when doing so is absolutely indispensable, 
even in the face of rulemaking silence.153  The better approach, taken 
by William Ryan, recognizes that procedural rules will always contain 
gaps and that courts can and do fill those gaps—even if the gaps are 
not significant enough to cripple the courts—as a type of “specialized 
federal common law.”154  Moreover, insisting that courts exercise 
independent power only when doing so is indispensable ignores what 
courts actually do.155  The case reporters are filled with examples of 
courts, including the Supreme Court, exercising powers that are 
convenient but not indispensable.  Examples include dismissal for 
forum non-conveniens,156 dismissal for want of prosecution,157 
sanctioning litigants for misconduct, and appointing special masters 
or auditors to assist with a case.158 
While this Article takes a position on the minimum features of 
Article III judicial power, it does not purport to speak to the outer 
 
 151  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b) contemplates gaps and allows judges to 
fill them with local rules and practices.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b).  Because Rule 83 
allows judges to do by rule what they sometimes do by asserting inherent power, 
Professor Samuel Jordan contends that the use of inherent power as a gap-filler is 
gratuitous.  See Jordan, supra note 115, at 314–15. 
 152  See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 115, at 313 n.6 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 
11 U.S. 32, 34 (2011)) (“[C]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our 
Courts of justice from the nature of their institution.”). 
 153  Van Alstyne, supra note 114, at 118, 129 (1976) (arguing that courts and the 
executive may only assert inherent powers when the need to do so is indispensable); 
Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847 (2001) (same). 
 154  Ryan, supra note 26, at 777–78 (citing Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of 
the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964)). 
 155  See FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) (expressly contemplating that judges will face 
procedural gaps); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“One of the shaping 
purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by 
getting away from local rules.”). 
 156  See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 
(2007) (recognizing federal courts’ “common law” power to dismiss cases on the 
basis of forum non-conveniens). 
 157  See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (2007) (“The authority of 
a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action with prejudice because of his failure 
to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted.”). 
 158  See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (“Courts have (at least in 
the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with 
appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties.”).  
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limits of the power.  For instance, judicial power may comprise 
something more than just the power to decide.  William Ryan argues 
persuasively that the power to decide cases includes, necessarily, some 
level of analytical independence, citing United States v. Klein.159  Ryan 
essentially argues that Klein stands for the proposition that Congress 
cannot dictate how a court decides a pending case.160  This argument 
may be subject to the criticism that Congress directs the outcome of 
cases all of the time, including pending cases and cases on direct 
review, through retroactive legislation.161  This Article does not weigh 
in on the longstanding debate about what Klein means.  In any event, 
Ryan contends that Klein and other decisions support a notion of 
judicial power that prevents Congress from interfering in the judicial 
decision-making process to effectively decide the outcome of cases.162  
This is certainly a broader concept of judicial power than this Article 
advocates. 
And if the minimum attributes of judicial power are something 
greater than what this Article describes, then it necessarily follows 
that what is essential to support those features must be greater as well.  
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that judicial power includes a 
certain level of analytical independence, some traditional inherent 
powers are still plainly not necessary to support it.  This is because at 
least some traditionally inherent powers have no connection to the 
power to decide cases or the process by which a court decides. 
The power to dismiss cases for want of prosecution and for forum 
non-conveniens is not essential.163  The power to dismiss a case stands in 
stark contrast with the power to stay or continue cases.  While the 
power to dismiss a case for want of prosecution may be helpful to the 
court in conducting its business because it will have more time for 
other matters that are being prosecuted diligently, it is not essential.  
This is true even if the court faces an incredibly congested docket.  If 
congestion is interfering with a court’s ability to decide cases based 
on legal reasons, it has the power to stay or continue certain cases 
 
 159  See Ryan, supra note 26, at 791–92 (arguing that United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 
128 (1870), protects the analytical independence of federal courts). 
 160  See id. 
 161  See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976) (holding that 
Congress amended the relevant statute to provide discrimination protection based 
on pregnancy after Supreme Court held pregnancy did not qualify). 
 162  See Ryan, supra note 26, at 791–92. 
 163  See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 2, at 852 (disagreeing with the result in Link v. 
Wabash R.R. Co., and observing “a court’s ability to dismiss cases for want of 
prosecution is not essential to its functioning”). 
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while it considers others.164  Because staying or continuing cases may 
be vital to proper adjudication in some circumstances, however, the 
power to stay is essential, as described above.  Thus, Congress may 
regulate, or totally eliminate, the power to dismiss for want of 
prosecution.165 
Likewise, the power to dismiss for forum non-conveniens is not 
essential to the exercise of Article III judicial power.  The reasons 
typically underlying a forum non-conveniens dismissal include both 
private and public interests.166  Among the public interests, courts 
point to court administration concerns, like docket burdens on the 
federal courts, and the interests of the foreign tribunal.167  Neither of 
those concerns implicate a threat to Article III judicial power because 
in the case of the former, courts can always stay actions to properly 
adjudicate each one, and in the case of the latter, respect for 
international tribunals is not a cognizable Article III judicial power 
interest.  Thus, eliminating the power would not interfere with court 
power to decide cases, nor would it interfere with courts’ analytical 
processes.  While the power to dismiss for forum non-conveniens may be 
helpful, it is not necessary to effectuate core judicial power. 
While the exercise of non-essential independent power is firmly 
entrenched in both doctrine and practice,168 Congress has plenary 
authority to abrogate non-essential powers.169  Recent cases have 
raised the question of whether another traditional independent 
power, the power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court, is 
essential or merely beneficial. 
 
 164  See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (noting that courts have 
broad powers to stay cases and manage their docket). 
 165  Cf., e.g., Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847. 
 166  See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257–60 (1981) (assessing 
both public and private interest factors when deciding that a foreign forum was more 
convenient). 
 167  Cf., e.g., id.; see also Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 
422, 430 (2007) (“Dismissal for forum non conveniens reflects a court’s assessment of a 
range of considerations, most notably the convenience to the parties and the 
practical difficulties that can attend the adjudication of a dispute in a certain 
locality.”).  
 168  See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 39–41 (1991); see also Pushaw, 
supra note 2, at 847–49. 
 169  See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 39–41; see also Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847–49. 
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IV. CONGRESS CANNOT PRECLUDE THE EXERCISE OF THE TRADITIONAL 
INDEPENDENT POWER TO VACATE JUDGMENTS FOR FRAUD ON THE 
COURT 
The power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court allows 
courts to vacate otherwise final judgments when a court officer, 
including an attorney, commits fraud that results in an improper 
final judgment.170  Although the precise limits of the doctrine are the 
subject of dispute, typical examples of fraud on the court have 
included document falsification by an attorney, a judge acting under 
the influence of a bribe, or an attorney wrongfully withholding 
evidence.  The power extends to judgments for which the time to 
appeal has long since passed.171  Indeed, the power to vacate 
judgments for fraud on the court does not have a firm time limit and 
could theoretically be exercised, in the absence of a valid laches 
defense, at any future time after the fraud is discovered.172 
This power has run head on into Congress’s attempt to limit 
successive habeas applications by inmates.  In 1996, Congress passed 
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).173  One 
of AEDPA’s purposes was to shorten the habeas process and 
eliminate repetitive, unmeritorious habeas claims that were 
supposedly clogging the federal courts.174  To do so, AEDPA placed 
onerous restrictions on “successive” habeas applications.175 
Last year, AEDPA collided with the power to vacate judgments 
for fraud on the court.  The Sixth Circuit held, in Johnson v. Bell, that 
the fraud on the court power was subject to AEDPA’s restrictions 
even if those restrictions could ultimately eliminate the power in 
certain classes of cases.176  This decision effectively subordinated an 
essential independent power, the fraud on the court power, to an act 
of Congress.  Both the history of the fraud on the court power, and 
the power’s essential nature, mandate that Johnson and other cases 
following in its wake be overturned. 
 
 170  See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944). 
 171  See, e.g., id. (overturning a judgment founded on a trade publication an expert 
was wrongfully paid to write). 
 172  See, e.g., In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The 
doctrine of laches applies to such [independent] actions.”). 
 173  See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006). 
 174  See Benjamin R. Orye III, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction Becomes 
Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441, 453 (2002). 
 175  See id. § 2244(b)(1). 
 176  605 F.3d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 2010).  
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A. The History of the Fraud on the Court Power Suggests That It Is 
Essential to the Exercise of Article III Judicial Power 
The power to vacate a judgment for fraud on the court gives 
courts the power to vacate a final judgment, and thus reopen a case 
after the trial court’s jurisdiction over the case has expired.177  This 
power is available when a judicial officer commits fraud during the 
litigation process.178  Fraud on the court is usually discovered long 
after the judgment is final and cannot be vacated through normal 
procedural or appellate means.  The history of fraud on the court 
indicates that the power arose out of necessity and that the 
circumstances that gave rise to it persist in modern courts.179  While 
the history of any particular court power is not dispositive on the 
question of whether the power is essential, the origin of a particular 
power can shed light on its necessity. 
The “savings clause” of Rule 60(d) (formerly Rule 60(b)) 
recognizes fraud on the court as an inherent basis for relief from a 
final judgment,180 but the rule did not create the power to obtain 
relief based on fraud on the court.181  Rather, the rule is rooted in a 
long line of precedent recognizing the right to relief from judgments 
procured by fraud.182  Actionable fraud in the judgment relief context 
is delineated into two primary categories: inter-party fraud and fraud 
on the court.183 
Before Rule 60(d), courts had limited their own independent 
power to vacate judgments for inter-party fraud.  This limitation 
traces its roots, in part, to nineteenth century cases recognizing the 
power of a court to relieve one party from a final judgment procured 
 
 177  See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d) (observing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
disturb the traditional inherent power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court). 
 178  See Hazel-Atlas Glass, Co., 332 U.S. at 244. 
 179  See, e.g., id.; Toscano v. C. I. R., 441 F.2d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 180  See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(3) (“[T]his rule does not limit a court’s power to . . . 
set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”); see also Dustin B. Benham, Twombly 
and Iqbal Should (Finally!) Put The Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud Out of 
Its Misery, 64 SMU L. REV. 649, 659–67 (2011) (exploring the historical development 
of Rule 60(b), (d) and its relationship to fraud on the court claims). 
 181  Cf. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 244. 
 182  See, e.g., United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 68 (1878); Hazel-Atlas 
Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 244. 
 183  See 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.81[1][b][v] 
(3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter MOORE’S] (noting that courts attempt to, and should, 
“distinguish between an ordinary claim of fraud between parties that resulted in a 
wrongly procured judgment and a special category of fraud claim that affects the very 
integrity of the judicial process itself”).  
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by the fraud of another party.184  In these cases, the courts developed 
what has become known as the intrinsic fraud rule.  According to this 
rule, courts could vacate judgments for inter-party fraud only when 
the fraud was extrinsic to the underlying proceeding instead of 
intrinsic.  Throckmorton v. United States remains the style case on the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud and the root of 
modern judgment-relief precedent in the fraud context.185  In 
Throckmorton, the Supreme Court limited litigants’ power to reopen 
final judgments for fraud to situations where the fraud essentially 
prevented the party from coming to court or presenting a claim (i.e., 
extrinsic fraud).186  Under the Throckmorton test, most egregious 
litigation fraud, like falsification of documents or perjury (both forms 
of intrinsic fraud under Throckmorton), was not a basis to reopen a 
judgment.187  The pressure that this severe limitation put on the 
judgment relief system arguably led to the creation of the modern 
fraud on the court doctrine. 
After limiting judgment-modification power for inter-party 
fraud, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of judgments procured 
through litigation fraud in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.188  
The alleged fraud (fabrication of a trade publication and false 
testimony) appeared to be intrinsic under the standard set out in 
Throckmorton.  But the Court reopened the case and decisively revived 
the independent power to vacate judgments for what has become 
known as “fraud on the court.” 
In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., Hartford Empire 
Co. (Hartford) sought a patent from the U.S. Patent Office for a 
machine that helped make glass bottles.189  The patent office was 
largely hostile to Hartford’s patent application, leaving Hartford 
looking for a way to convince the office to grant the patent.190  
Hartford ultimately concocted a scheme to draft a phony trade article 
touting the novelty of its invention, to be signed by a prominent 
bottling expert.191  Based, at least in part, on the article, the patent 
 
 184  See Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 68. 
 185  See id. 
 186  See id. at 66–68. 
 187  See id. But see Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1891) (granting relief 
for fraud that appears intrinsic under the Throckmorton standard articulated a few 
years earlier). 
 188  322 U.S. 238, 244–45 (1944).  
 189  See id. at 240. 
 190  See id. 
 191  See id. at 239–41. 
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office granted the application in 1928.192  Hartford later filed suit 
against Hazel-Atlas Glass Company (Hazel) for patent infringement, 
using its new patent.193  The plaintiff failed to prove infringement.194  
Hartford appealed the unfavorable decision, and the circuit court 
reversed the district court’s decision, “[q]uoting copiously from the 
article” to support its finding that Hazel infringed on Hartford’s 
patent.195 
Years later, after learning that the article was falsified and that 
Hartford paid the expert to sign it, Hazel filed a petition to seek relief 
from the original 1932 judgment in the circuit court.196 
Justice Black, writing for the Court, observed that “where 
enforcement of the judgment is manifestly unconscionable,” a court 
has the independent power to grant relief from a long-since final 
judgment.197  Although the judgment from which Hazel sought relief 
was nine years old (well outside of the term that the court rendered it 
in), the Court granted Hazel relief.198  Hartford’s conduct amounted 
to a deliberate, calculated scheme to “defraud . . . the Circuit Court 
of Appeals” in the original action.199  Critical to the Court’s decision, 
and the most important material distinction from Throckmorton, was 
the fact that Hartford’s attorney participated directly.200  Because an 
attorney is a court officer, Hartford’s conduct not only injured the 
opposing party but also injured the integrity of the courts, thus 
making it actionable.201 
The Court granted relief from the judgment, formally 
recognizing the independent power to vacate judgments for fraud on 
the court even when those frauds would appear to be merely intrinsic 
absent the participation of a court officer.202  Beyond righting a wrong 
for an individual party and protecting the Court’s integrity, there is 
an implication of necessity in what the court did.  The fraud in Hazel-
Atlas was so egregious that the nefarious court officer had prevented 
the court from deciding the case based on impartial legal reasons.  
 
 192  See id. at 240–41. 
 193  See id. at 241. 
 194  See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 241.  
 195  See id. at 241–42. 
 196  See id. at 241–43.  
 197  Id. at 244–45 (citation omitted). 
 198  Id. at 244–51. 
 199  Id. at 245. 
 200  See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 246–47.  
 201  See id. 
 202  See id. at 251. 
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Instead, the Court had been effectively hijacked, by its own officers, 
for the private purposes of a particular party. 
Since Hazel-Atlas, both the Supreme Court and lower federal 
courts have continued to recognize the independent power to vacate 
judgments for fraud on the court.203  In its modern incarnation, fraud 
on the court is fraud that seriously affects the judicial machinery or 
involves officers of the court itself.204  Most circuits agree that fraud on 
the court requires the participation of a court official or officer, 
including attorneys.205  Whatever the exact parameters of the fraud on 
the court doctrine, courts and commentators, with near unanimity, 
have confirmed that the power is “inherent,” or independent, 
emanating from the court itself..206  The modern Supreme Court, 
writing about Rule 60(b), which recognized the fraud on the court 
power before Rule 60(d) was restyled, held: “[Rule 60(b)] confirms 
the courts’ own inherent and discretionary power, ‘firmly established in 
English practice long before the foundation of our Republic,’ to set 
aside a judgment whose enforcement would work inequity.”207 
Thus, the power to vacate a judgment for fraud on the court is 
an independent power, deeply rooted in American court practice and 
reaffirmed by the modern Court.  The remaining important question 
about the fraud on the court power, then, is whether the power is 
essential to the exercise of core judicial power and not just beneficial.  
If it is, indeed, essential, Congress’s attempts to eliminate it are 
constitutionally invalid. 
 
 203  See, e.g., In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“[F]raud upon the court includes both attempts to subvert the integrity of the court 
and fraud by an officer of the court.”).  
 204  See, e.g., id. (stating that misconduct of court officer is fraud on the court); 
Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & 
Helpers of Am., 675 F.2d 1349, 1358 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that the definition of 
fraud on the court is “elusive” but includes fraud “in which the integrity of the court 
and its ability to function impartially is directly impinged”). 
 205  See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 348–50 (6th Cir. 1993).  
 206  See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 234 (1995); see also 
MOORE’S, supra note 183, at ¶ 60App.108[3] (“A court has inherent power to set 
aside a judgment for fraud practiced upon it, and amended Rule 60(b) states that it 
does not limit the power of a court so to do.”).  
 207  Plaut, 514 U.S. at 234 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 
322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)) (emphasis added).  Note that the savings clause that 
recognizes the fraud on the court power has now been moved to Rule 60(d) as part 
of the restyling of the civil rules.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d). 
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B. The Power to Vacate Judgments for Fraud on the Court Is Essential 
to the Full Exercise of Judicial Power 
The independent power to vacate judgments for fraud on the 
court is essential to the exercise of the core judicial function for at 
least two reasons.  First, issuing a judgment after adjudicating cases 
based on legal reasons is a central part of the core judicial power, and 
the power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court is essential to 
the exercise of that power.208  Second, the power to vacate judgments 
for fraud on the court is essential to preserve at least a modicum of 
integrity consistent with what it means to be an Article III “court.”209 
First, the power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court is 
essential to the core power of a court rendering a judgment based on 
legal reasons as appropriate in the particular case.  Fraud on the 
court necessarily involves court officers, like judges or attorneys, 
working to undermine the integrity of the adjudication process, 
specifically with the goal of obtaining a result for the benefit of a 
personal or professional interest.210  For instance, if an attorney, 
acting as a court officer, engages in a well-hidden scheme to suborn 
perjury, and the perjury undermines the integrity of the court system 
by decisively affecting the outcome of the proceedings, the court was 
deprived of the power to render a judgment based on legal reasons.  
Rather, the court in that instance bases its judgment on the 
fraudulent, extra-legal actions of one of its own officers.  The power 
to vacate a judgment for fraud on the court, and the correlative 
power to reissue a judgment based on the true merits of the case 
without the fraudulent influence of a court officer, is necessary to 
render at least one judgment based on legal reasons—a core judicial 
prerogative. 
In part, the concept of fraud on the court as an essential power 
involves properly divorcing court entities working under the corrupt 
influence of their officers from the Article III concept of “judicial 
power” vested in “courts.”  When, for instance, an Article III judge 
decides a case based on a bribe instead of legal reasons, this Article 
contends that the Article III court, because of the extra-legal actions 
of the judge, never had the chance, or power, to properly pass 
 
 208  See Pushaw, supra note 2, at 847; Liebman & Ryan, supra note 67, at 771 
(power to decide cases means “dispositively to arrange the rights and responsibilities 
of the parties on the basis of independently developed legal reasons”). 
 209  Cf. Pushaw, supra note 2, at 848 (“[E]ssential ‘court’ power may be exercised 
regardless of whether adjudication has been affected.”). 
 210  See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 244, 246–47.  
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judgment on the merits of the case as an Article III court.211  In effect, 
the court’s machinery turned against itself to defeat its essential 
purpose: the decision of cases based on legal reasons, not extra-legal 
ones.212 
A likely response to this position is that, in our adversarial system 
of justice, courts are deprived of the chance to pass on the true merits 
all of the time.  This might result from a multitude of practical 
circumstances: a party loses a key document, an attorney simply 
forgets to put on a key witness, or a judge or jury forgets a key piece 
of evidence when deciding the case.  The critical distinguishing 
feature of each of these circumstances is that each one involves court 
officers working to accomplish the judicial function, albeit 
imperfectly.  Fraud on the court is different.213  With fraud on the 
court, court officers are actively working to render a judgment not 
based on the merits but rather based on extra-judicial considerations, 
like self-interest, corruption, or extra-legal bias.214  By doing so, they 
are not functioning as courts, but rather as the instruments of the 
individuals who have fatally corrupted them. 
The power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court is 
necessary to give courts power, even if only in the long run, to 
properly adjudicate cases at least one time.  If Congress were to strip 
courts of the power, it would essentially prevent them from deciding 
some cases based on legal reason even after blatant corruption 
becomes apparent.215 
Contrast the power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court 
with the power to vacate or modify judgments for other reasons.216  
 
 211  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 7, at 197 (James Madison) 
(characterizing the proper exercise of judicial power; “[t]he decision [of a particular 
case] is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the 
usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality”) (emphasis 
added).  
 212  See, e.g., id.  
 213  See Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 675 F.2d 1349, 1358 (4th Cir. 1982) (fraud on the 
court is fraud that undermines the judicial function). 
 214  See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 241–44 (attorneys conspire with party 
and expert witness to fabricate article as evidence of patent novelty; court finds fraud 
on the court). 
 215  Cf. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 67, at 772; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 
7, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (courts should not exercise “WILL instead of 
JUDGMENT”).  
 216  Compare Great Coastal Exp., Inc., 675 F.2d at 1357–58 (fraud on the court is 
construed narrowly and is distinct from Rule 60(b)(3) fraud), with FED. R. CIV. P. 
60(b)(1)–(6) (allowing courts to vacate judgments for, among other reasons, 
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Although courts have the undoubted power to modify their 
judgments in some instances, this power is usually not beyond the 
purview of congressional action.  For instance, the Rules 
appropriately limit the power of district courts to modify or vacate 
their judgments for most substantive reasons to one year from 
entry.217  This limitation is appropriate because a court error, or even 
the malfeasance of a party, is distinct from fraud on the court.  A 
mistake in adjudication does not mean that the court was deprived of 
the power to adjudicate the matter.  The court simply exercised its 
power imperfectly or based on imperfect information.  The balance 
between finality and perfection in judgments is the subject of a long 
debate, but courts and commentators, on the whole, have never 
doubted the power of Congress to make even erroneous judgments 
final in most cases.218  The power to adjudicate in such cases is not 
hampered in normal circumstances because courts had the 
opportunity to pass on the merits of the case at least once.219  This 
makes congressional limitations on normal judgment relief 
 
mistake, accident, new evidence, discharge, and regular fraud). 
 217  Rule 60(c) requires motions brought on the grounds described in Rule 
60(b)(1)–(3) to be brought within a “reasonable time,” no later than one year after 
the entry of judgment.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)–(3), (c).  These reasons include 
mistake, newly discovered evidence, and regular fraud.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)–(3).  
The remaining 60(b) grounds described in 60(b)(4)–(6), along with fraud on the 
court claims, may be raised at any reasonable time.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4)–(6), (c), 
(d). 
 218  Cf., e.g., Mary Kay Kane, Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a 
Rule, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 41, 85–86 (1978) (lamenting the fact that uncertainty 
produced by Rule 60(b)(6) has “perverted justice” by championing “ultimate right” 
at the expense of finality and suggesting rule based solutions could make more 
judgments final). 
 219  In both Hazel-Atlas and more recently in Calderon v. Thompson, the Supreme 
Court recognized that the fraud on the court power and the power to vacate final 
judgments in some circumstances are essential to the proper function of the 
judiciary.  Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 244; Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 
549–50, 567 (1998).  In Hazel-Atlas, the Court held that the independent power to 
vacate final judgments developed “to fulfill a universally recognized need for correcting 
injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a 
departure from rigid adherence to the [final judgment rule].”  Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 
322 U.S. at 244 (emphasis added).  Similarly, while disagreeing on the outcome of 
the merits of an actual innocence claim, in Calderon v. Thompson, the Court 
unanimously agreed that appellate courts also have the independent power to recall 
their mandates.  See Calderon, 523 U.S. at 549–50, 567 (majority and dissent agree that 
courts of appeals have the inherent power to recall their mandates).  Having 
described the power as both inherent and a universal necessity, the Court properly 
recognized that correction of judgments for, among other reasons, fraud on the 
court allows courts to properly adjudicate cases.  See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 
244; Calderon, 523 U.S. at 549–50, 567.  
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mechanisms appropriate where the same limitation on the fraud on 
the court power would not be. 
Second, the fraud on the court power protects the ability of the 
judicial branch to function as the “courts” described in Article III.  
Integrity and the power to sanction certain offensive conduct are 
critical features of any “court.”  Judicial entities hijacked by 
fraudulent officers who are making and influencing decisions based 
on extra-legal considerations are not actually functioning as courts.220  
Indeed, any system that allows judicial and court officer corruption to 
continue unchecked can hardly be called a “judicial” or “court” 
system at all.  This is because our Framers envisioned courts as 
impartial entities tasked with deciding cases based on legal reasons.  
The Framers were adamant that the court system not become a tool 
of the sovereign or any particular extra-legal interests.221 
This vision of courts as impartial, independent bodies is 
exemplified by the structural separation the Framers provided when 
making the judiciary its own branch and the lifetime appointments 
clause, which protects individual judges from outside influence.  Both 
of these systemic protections were intended to make a “court” 
something separate and independent from the other two branches.  
If fraud on the court by a judge or prosecutor, on behalf of another 
branch or an individual, cannot be remedied when it is detected, the 
framers’ original structural protections of the judicial branch become 
moot because the interference could continue unchecked.222  And the 
entity that is functioning under the influence of such corruption 
without the ability to correct it cannot be called a court in the Article 
III sense.  Moreover, unsanctioned fraud, whenever it is detected, 
also fatally undermines the public’s perception of the judiciary as an 
impartial adjudicative body.  This spawns more fraud and less respect 
for the process as a whole, creating a cycle of deteriorating judicial 
independence and integrity.  Thus, the power to sanction fraud on 
the court by vacating or modifying a judgment is essential to the 
continued proper function of Article III courts.  Accordingly, the 
power to vacate a judgment for fraud on the court is an independent 
power that should only be classified as essential. 
 
 220  Cf. Pushaw, supra note 2, at 848. 
 221  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 7, at 197 (James Madison) (Article 
III courts are impartial).  
 222  Of course, impeachment might be available in some circumstances to remedy 
rampant corruption in a particular court, but impeaching a judge without the 
correlative power to revisit the judge’s wrongful judgments would not be sufficient to 
make the fraud on the court power non-essential. 
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C. The Supreme Court Inadvertently Creates a Constitutional Dilemma 
with Gonzalez v. Crosby 
In Gonzalez v. Crosby, the Court answered the question of whether 
a Rule 60(b) proceeding to vacate a final habeas corpus judgment 
should be construed as a successive habeas petition, subject to 
AEDPA’s restrictions on successive habeas actions.223  Gonzalez, a 
Florida state prisoner, sought Rule 60(b) relief from the previous 
denial of a habeas petition.224  His 60(b) claim was that a new 
procedural ruling by the Supreme Court mandated that the 
previously denied petition be considered anew.225  The Supreme 
Court ultimately agreed with Gonzalez and found that his Rule 60 
claim was not subject to AEDPA’s successive habeas bar.226  
Unfortunately, the opinion inappropriately subjected many other 
Rule 60(b) claims to AEDPA’s onerous restrictions on second habeas 
petitions. 
Gonzalez is not a case about inherent power or fraud on the 
court.227  But the opinion was drafted broadly and imprecisely, 
making it susceptible to misinterpretation by the lower courts.  This 
misinterpretation has led to a constitutional dilemma, pitting 
AEDPA’s statutory restrictions on successive habeas petitions against 
courts’ essential independent power to vacate or modify judgments 
for fraud on the court.228  The details of the case show, however, that 
an appropriately narrow and precise reading of Gonzalez makes clear 
that the Court has not directly answered the question of whether 
Congress can eliminate the power to vacate or modify judgments for 
fraud on the court. 
In Gonzalez, a prisoner sought federal habeas corpus relief from 
his Florida state court conviction in June 1997 after filing two state 
habeas petitions.229  AEDPA was passed the year before, in 1996.230  
Under law applicable at the time, Gonzalez’s deadline for filing 
federal habeas petitions was one year from the effective date of 
 
 223  545 U.S. 524, 526 (2005). 
 224  Id. at 526–27. 
 225  Id. at 527. 
 226  See id. at 530–33. 
 227  See id. at 526–27. 
 228  See Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 2010) (implying that courts’ 
sole power to vacate judgments stems from either Rule 60 or AEDPA, not inherent 
power).  
 229  See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 526–27. 
 230  See id. 
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AEDPA—April 23, 1997.231  Gonzalez, in response to the state’s 
motion to dismiss his federal petition as time barred, asserted that 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations should be tolled for 163 days, the 
number of days that his second state habeas application, filed before 
the federal habeas application at issue, was pending because AEDPA 
allowed tolling for “properly filed” state habeas applications.232  The 
district court disagreed and dismissed his federal habeas petition, 
holding that the state habeas application had not been “properly 
filed” because it was untimely and successive, rendering Gonzalez’s 
federal petition untimely by two months.233 
Some time after the district court dismissed Gonzalez’s petition, 
the Supreme Court decided Artuz v. Bennett.234  In Artuz, the court 
held that a state habeas application was properly filed for tolling 
purposes even if it was barred by state procedural rules.235  About nine 
months after the Supreme Court decided Artuz, Gonzalez filed a Rule 
60(b) motion, relying on Civil Rule 60(b)(6)’s “any other reason” 
provision, which allows a district court to reopen a judgment for 
reasons other than those articulated somewhere else in Rule 60.236  
This motion sought relief based on the change in tolling law as 
articulated in Artuz and asked the district court to vacate its 
judgment.237  The district court denied the motion, and the Eleventh 
Circuit held en banc that the 60(b) motion constituted a successive 
habeas petition and was thus barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a section of 
AEDPA that bars successive habeas applications in most 
circumstances) because the motion did not meet § 2244’s stringent 
criteria for successive habeas petitions.238  Section 2244 of AEDPA bars 
successive habeas applications when the application asserts a claim 
that has been previously adjudicated.239  Even if the claim has not 
been previously raised, it is barred unless it (1) relies on a new rule of 
constitutional law made retroactive by a decision of the Supreme 
Court or (2) relies on newly discovered facts showing a high 
 
 231  See id. 
 232  See id. 
 233  See id. 
 234  See id. at 527 (citing Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000)).  
 235  See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 526–27. 
 236  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 
 237  Gonzalez styled his motion a “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,” but the 
Court noted that the contents of the motion clearly sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief.  See 
Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 527 n.1.  
 238  See id. at 527–28. 
 239  See id. at 529–30. 
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probability of actual innocence.240  The Eleventh Circuit held that, 
when construed as a successive habeas petition, Gonzalez’s motion 
did not meet any of the § 2244 exceptions.241 
The Supreme Court disagreed, in part, with the circuit court, 
announcing a new statutory analysis that turns on whether the Rule 
60(b) motion asserts a “claim” for relief and is thus an “application” 
subject to § 2244’s successive habeas restrictions.242  According to the 
Court, because Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion did not assert a 
“claim” for merits relief, but rather sought to reverse a procedural 
ruling, it was not a successive habeas application subject to AEDPA’s 
restrictions.243 
 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, framed the question in 
the case more broadly than the facts actually suggest.244  Instead of 
appropriately limiting the scope of the issue to Rule 60(b)(6) 
motions (the procedural ground relied on by Gonzalez in this case), 
or even Rule 60(b)(1)–(5) cases (i.e., non savings-clause cases that 
rely on a 60(b) enumerated ground for relief), he posed the 
following question: “The question presented is whether, in a habeas 
case, [Rule 60(b)] motions are subject to the additional restrictions 
that apply to ‘second or successive’ habeas corpus petitions under the 
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996.”245 
At the time the Court decided Gonzalez, Rule 60(b) contained 
not only the enumerated grounds for relief contained in 60(b)(1)–
(6) but also the savings clauses that recognized the longstanding 
power of courts to entertain an independent action or vacate a 
judgment for fraud on the court.246  Justice Scalia’s decision to frame 
the question to engulf the entirety of Rule 60(b), instead of the 
60(b)(6) ground actually raised in the case, is problematic for two 
reasons.  First, by holding that all Rule 60(b) motions are subject to a 
statutory analysis, the opinion seems to imply that a motion raising 
fraud on the court through the independent-power-recognizing 
 
 240  See id. 
 241  See id. at 528. 
 242  See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530–33. 
 243  See id. at 535–36.  
 244  See id. at 526. 
 245  Id. 
 246  The 2007 restyling placed the savings clauses in FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d) but did 
not materially change their substance.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (2006) with FED. 
R. CIV. P. 60(b), (d) (2011). 
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savings clauses is subject to the § 2244 analysis.247  Second, by holding 
that all Rule 60(b) motions are potentially subject to AEDPA, the 
opinion raises the possibility that a fraud on the court claim brought 
through Rule 60(b)(3), or another enumerated provision, is 
subjected to AEDPA’s statutory restrictions, even though the power to 
vacate judgments for fraud on the court does not emanate from Rule 
60(b).248  This holding would putatively make a court’s independent 
essential fraud on the court power subject to an act of Congress and 
thereby potentially infringe on lower courts’ Article III prerogatives. 
The Gonzalez analysis, as drafted, has the real potential to 
impermissibly subject courts’ essential independent power to hear 
fraud on the court claims to congressional impairment.  At the 
outset, it is important to emphasize that the Rule 60(b) savings clause 
recognizes the essential independent power to hear fraud on the court 
claims but it does not create that power.249  As discussed above, the 
power is both deeply rooted in the history of American courts and is 
essential to the exercise of core judicial power.250  But a literal reading 
of Justice Scalia’s analysis of the broad question has led some courts 
to conclude that the power is subordinate to a congressional 
enactment.251 
The critical and problematic part of the analysis proceeds in the 
following way: Because § 2244 applies to successive “applications,” 
 
 247  See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 526. 
 248  Some courts have applied Rule 60(b)(6) to consider fraud on the court claims 
in some instances.  While fraud on the court is not enumerated in 60(b)(1)–(5) and 
thus 60(b)(6) could be a conduit to bring the claim, fraud on the court claims are 
not dependent on 60(b)(6) for their existence as the savings clauses and history of 
fraud on the court demonstrate.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6), (d); see also Hazel-Atlas 
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944) (The power to vacate 
even final judgments for fraud “was firmly established in English practice long before 
the foundation of our Republic[.]”). 
 249  In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the Court noted the independent nature of the 
fraud on the court power, writing  
[I]nherent power also allows a federal court to vacate its own judgment 
upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court.  This 
“historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments,” 
is necessary to the integrity of the courts, for “tampering with the 
administration of justice in [this] manner . . . involves far more than an 
injury to a single litigant.  It is a wrong against the institutions set up to 
protect and safeguard the public.”  
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Hazel-
Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 245–46 (1944)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d) (“This rule 
does not limit a court’s power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”).  
 250  See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43–45. 
 251  See Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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which the Court defines as “filing[s] that contain[] one or more 
‘claims,’” the Court must determine whether the Rule 60(b) motion 
asserts a “claim.”252  A Rule 60(b) motion asserts a “claim” if it (1) 
adds a new ground for relief or (2) attacks the federal court’s 
previous ruling on the merits.253  Justice Scalia goes on to clarify that 
an attack on “the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings” is not a 
claim on the merits and even footnotes “[f]raud on the habeas court” 
as just such an example.254  This analysis, however, necessarily makes 
the availability of fraud on the court power dependent upon the 
applicability of an act of Congress, namely whether the fraud on the 
court action asserts a “claim” within the ambit of § 2244.  According 
to Justice Scalia’s opinion, the court has the power to hear a fraud on 
the court claim only if the claim is not an attack on the “merits,” and 
thus not a “claim” constituting part of an “application” subject to § 
2244.255  Thus, presumably under this analysis, a fraud on the court 
claim could be barred as a successive habeas application if the claim 
was construed to attack the merits.  Or, if the Court’s analysis is taken 
a step further, Congress could amend § 2244 to bar attacks on the 
integrity of the habeas proceedings, thus barring all fraud on the 
court claims.  This reading unacceptably subjects the independent 
fraud on the court power to congressional abrogation or undue 
regulation. 
Indeed, an anecdote from the case exemplifies the opinion’s 
traps for unwary lower courts.  The Court notes “that an attack based 
on . . . habeas counsel’s omissions ordinarily does not go to the 
integrity of the proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to 
have the merits determined favorably.”256  Clearly, however, some 
omissions of habeas counsel would rise to the level of fraud on the 
court and should not be subject to the material congressional 
impairment embodied in § 2244.  For instance, habeas counsel could 
have conspired with the prosecution to conceal exculpatory evidence 
from the court, omitting it from the original habeas application.  
Such an omission would rise to the level of fraud on the court, and 
the court could correct it upon discovery, despite any contrary 
congressional pronouncements. 
A reading of Gonzalez that suggests or requires that fraud on the 
 
 252  See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530. 
 253  See id. at 532.  
 254  See id. at 532 n.5. 
 255  See id. at 530–32. 
 256  See id. at 532 n.5 (citations omitted). 
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court claims are subject to congressional action should be rejected 
for multiple reasons.  First, Gonzalez was not a fraud on the court case.  
Gonzalez filed his motion based on Rule 60(b)(6) and asserted a 
change in the law as the basis for relief.257  Thus, despite a broadly 
drafted question presented that suggested otherwise, the case 
resolved a narrow issue and should not be read to resolve the fraud 
on the court question.  Second, Justice Scalia’s observation in 
footnote five of the opinion that “[f]raud on the federal habeas court 
is one example” of a defect in the integrity of the proceedings 
indicates that the Court views fraud on the court in a special category 
of post-judgment relief allegations that are, perhaps, beyond the 
purview of Congress.258  While this statement is admittedly a long way 
from previous holdings that the power to vacate judgments for fraud 
on the court is an “inherent,” or an essential independent power, 
footnote five, along with holdings in other cases, is at least suggestive 
that the Court recognizes that it is.259 
Third, the anecdote involving federal habeas counsel is qualified 
by statements that protect the fraud on the court power.260  Justice 
Scalia notes that an “omission” by federal habeas counsel is not 
“ordinarily” an attack on the integrity of the proceeding.261  The focus 
on “omissions” by habeas counsel suggests that misdeeds or action by 
habeas counsel would be more likely to exempt a post-judgment 
relief claim from § 2244.  This reasoning is consistent with the notion 
that most fraud on the court involves some action (i.e., conspiring 
with prosecutors in the hypothetical above could be construed as part 
of the fraudulent action supporting the motion).  And even if the 
potential fraud on the court did involve an omission, Scalia takes care 
to note that omissions by counsel are “ordinarily” not an attack on 
the integrity of the habeas court—there is room in the analysis for 
the exceptional case.262 
While a narrow reading of Gonzalez has promise to solve 
potential problems, the case still contains analytical traps for the 
unwary.  And unfortunately, at least one court of appeals has fallen 
into those traps, holding that a court does not have the independent 
 
 257  See id. at 527.  
 258  See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.5. 
 259  See id.; cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–45 (1991) (stating that 
the power to vacate for fraud on the court is “inherent” in courts). 
 260  See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.5. 
 261  See id. 
 262  See id. 
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power to entertain a fraud on the court claim if it does not satisfy § 
2244 as interpreted by Gonzalez.263 
D. Because of the Uncertainty Created by Gonzalez, Lower Courts Have 
Interpreted AEDPA to Preempt Their Independent Power to Vacate 
Judgments for Fraud on the Court 
Habeas cases often arise in the most serious matters that face the 
courts, including in the death penalty context.264  Judgments in those 
cases represent the most solemn pronouncements made by the 
justice system and require the most serious consideration that the 
system has to offer.265  Rule 60(b) motions and other vehicles used for 
bringing fraud on the court claims, in light of AEDPA’s restrictions 
on successive habeas applications, are often the last lifeline for the 
condemned in these cases.266  In Johnson v. Bell, a prisoner convicted 
of capital murder and sentenced to death, Donnie Johnson, 
challenged his death sentence in several procedural iterations that 
ultimately culminated in a federal habeas petition.267  In the habeas 
petition, Johnson alleged that the state effectively bought the 
testimony of its key witness, also facing serious criminal charges, by 
offering the witness a favorable “deal” in exchange for his 
testimony.268  In response to this claim, the state submitted the 
affidavits of the witness and the prosecutor that attested to the fact 
that there was no favorable deal for the witness.269  Based on this 
evidence, the district court denied habeas relief.270 
Several years later, Johnson filed a motion for relief from the 
judgment and asserted that the prosecutor and McCoy, the witness, 
 
 263  See Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that Rule 60(b) 
and § 2244 provide the sole means to raise post-habeas-judgment relief claims). 
 264  See, e.g., Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2867 (July 7, 2011) (denying stay of 
execution based on habeas application).  
 265  Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986) (positing that fidelity to proper 
legal principles in application of the death penalty is “the solemn obligation of a 
civilized society”). 
 266  In some limited instances, the Supreme Court has already indicated a 
willingness to provide some relief from § 2244’s successive habeas bar where the 
death penalty is at issue.  See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945 (2007) (stating 
that Section 2244 does not bar successive habeas petition raising a Ford v. Wainright 
incompetency claim as soon as the claim is ripe). 
 267  See Johnson, 605 F.3d at 334–35. 
 268  See id. at 336–37. 
 269  See id. at 337. 
 270  See id. 
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submitted false affidavits regarding the alleged deal.271  The motion 
asked the district court to vacate the conviction based on its “plenary 
inherent Article III equitable powers” to vacate or modify judgments 
for fraud on the court and Rule 60(b).272  The district court denied 
the motion, and Johnson appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.273 
The Sixth Circuit walked directly into the trap set by Gonzalez.  In 
Johnson, the question of whether a court has independent (or 
“inherent”) power to vacate a judgment for fraud on the court was 
directly before the circuit court.274  The circuit court found that 
AEDPA and Gonzalez eliminated the power, holding: 
The district court declined to base its authority upon Article 
III and instead recognized that Rule 60(b), which is 
inherently equitable in nature, empowers district courts to 
revise judgments when necessary to ensure their integrity.  
We endorse this approach.  Rule 60(b)(6) provides that a 
district court may grant relief from judgment “for any other 
reason that justifies relief.”  This provision confers upon the 
district court a broad equitable power to “do justice.”  
Particularly in light of the approach taken by Supreme Court in 
Gonzalez, Rule 60(b) represents the sole authority, short of a 
successive application approved by this court, under which a 
district court may entertain a challenge to a prior denial of habeas 
relief.275 
After holding that AEDPA and Rule 60(b) were the “sole authority” 
to entertain a fraud on the court claim, the court went on to hold 
that Johnson’s fraud on the court claim did in fact go to the integrity 
of the habeas proceedings, allowing the court to reach the merits of 
Johnson’s claim.276  Based on the high standards to prove a fraud on 
 
 271  See id. 
 272  See id. at 336. 
 273  See Johnson, 605 F.3d at 335–36. 
 274  See id. at 336 (“[T]he motions for equitable relief under review cited two 
sources of authority [including] what petitioner terms the district court’s ‘plenary 
inherent Article III equitable powers to revise or amend a judgment in the interest of 
justice.’”).  
 275  See id. (emphasis added). 
 276  This raises the question of why the circuit court felt the need to reach the 
inherent power question at all.  Johnson did advance a second claim in his 60(b) 
motion alleging prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument.  See id. at 339–40.  
This claim was not based on any alleged fraud but rather impermissible vouching by 
the prosecutor for the credibility of a witness.  See id. at 340.  The circuit could have 
avoided the inherent power question by simply holding that Johnson’s fraud on the 
court claim satisfied Gonzalez, escaping AEDPA.  Such a holding would have avoided 
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the court claim and Johnson’s own lack of diligence in pursuing the 
claim, the court ultimately denied his motion.  Johnson petitioned 
the Supreme Court based on the Rule 60(b) procedural ground (no 
appeal of the erroneous inherent power ruling was necessary because 
the court reached the claim through the Gonzalez statutory analysis).  
The Supreme Court declined review, missing the opportunity to rid 
the fraud on the court “menu” of the Sixth Circuit’s “smuggled-in 
dish.”277  In fairness to the Court, the question was not raised in 
Johnson’s petition for certiorari, but even a cursory reading of the 
lower court’s opinion reveals its serious constitutional infirmity.278 
Gonzalez undeniably creates confusion about the availability of 
independent power in fraud on the court cases after AEDPA, even in 
the most serious matters courts hear.  But confusion does not equal 
constitutional invalidity.  If AEPDA and Rule 60, as interpreted by 
Gonzalez, are co-extensive with the essential, independent fraud on 
the court power, providing the same relief the independent power 
would, AEDPA does not violate Article III.  On the other hand, if 
AEDPA impairs the exercise of the fraud on the court power in a way 
that prevents the full exercise of Article III judicial power, it is 
constitutionally invalid. 
E. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 Prevents the Full Exercise of Judicial Power by 
Impairing the Essential Independent Power to Vacate Judgments for 
Fraud on the Court 
AEDPA § 2244, as interpreted by Johnson and other lower courts, 
impairs the fraud on the court power in several circumstances.279  At 
the outset, § 2244 does potentially apply to fraud on the habeas court 
claims.  While a proper reading of Gonzalez makes clear that § 2244 
does not apply to some fraud on the court actions, it is equally clear 
 
the need to rely on inherent power to entertain the claim and Johnson’s 
prosecutorial misconduct claim was not based on a ground that would fall within the 
ambit of inherent power whether or not it existed. 
 277  Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009) (per curiam). 
 278  See Johnson, 605 F.3d at 336. 
 279  See, e.g., id. (AEDPA and Rule 60(b) provide the source of power to entertain 
an action for fraud on the court).  Other courts have broadly interpreted the 
applicability of § 2244 to preclude fraud on the court actions where “allegations seek 
to assert or reassert habeas claims . . . or are inextricably intertwined with a claim of 
fraud committed on the state courts[.]”  Berryhill v. Evans, 466 F.3d 934, 937 (10th 
Cir. 2006).  Testing fraud on the court claims for whether they are inextricably 
intertwined with fraud claims subjugates the independent power to vacate judgments 
for fraud on the court to § 2244 while at the same time potentially barring valid 
evidence suppression fraud claims.  
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that under Johnson § 2244 does apply to fraud on the court claims in 
the Sixth Circuit.  Under Gonzalez, the threshold question is whether 
the Rule 60(b) motion asserts a claim going to the “merits” 
underlying the habeas judgment it attacks.280  If it does, it is subject to 
§ 2244’s successive habeas petition analysis.281  That analysis allows 
successive habeas petitions to go forward only in very narrow 
circumstances. 
As described above, the Court takes pains to note in Gonzalez that 
claims regarding the merits do not include challenges to the integrity 
of the habeas proceeding itself.282  But often, fraud on the court 
claims regarding the integrity of the habeas proceedings will also be 
construed to attack the merits of the habeas decision.  For instance, 
imagine that a claim that a prosecutor unlawfully and fraudulently 
suppressed evidence in a state criminal trial is challenged in a federal 
habeas petition.  The district court denies the challenge based on the 
prosecutor’s affidavit swearing that he did not withhold evidence.  
Sometime later, the prisoner discovers additional proof that the 
prosecutor hid evidence and files a fraud on the court action 
alleging, again, the suppression claim.  Does the action attack the 
merits of the habeas denial (the prosecutor withheld evidence) or the 
integrity of the habeas proceeding (the prosecutor lied about 
withholding evidence)?  It could be construed to attack both.  
Gonzalez held that “when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the 
substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, 
but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,” it 
is not a successive habeas petition subject to § 2244.283 
But this language does not safeguard against situations where 
the Rule 60(b) or fraud on the court action attacks both the merits 
and the integrity of the habeas proceeding simultaneously.  In these 
cases, which Gonzalez does not expressly contemplate, the opinion’s 
other language indicates that “if [the Rule 60(b) motion] attacks the 
federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits . . . [it] is 
effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under 
the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief,” 
and thus subject to § 2244’s successive habeas petition restrictions.284  
Accordingly, § 2244, as interpreted by lower courts engaged in an 
 
 280  See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530–32 (2005). 
 281  See id. at 532. 
 282  See id. 
 283  See id. 
 284  See id. (emphasis in original). 
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impermissibly broad reading of Gonzalez, does apply to and restrict at 
least some valid fraud on the court claims that would otherwise be 
within the essential non-core power of the court. 
Because some fraud on the court actions are subject to § 2244, 
the extent to which § 2244 restricts courts’ power to exercise their 
essential power to hear those claims is essential to assess whether § 
2244 materially impairs the fraud on the court power.  First, § 2244 
bars any claim that has been previously brought by the applicant.285  
This restriction could be construed to bar claims like the one above 
involving the prosecutor suppressing evidence.  In that case, the 
habeas applicant sought relief on the basis of evidence wrongfully 
withheld in the underlying habeas proceeding and then raised a 
claim about evidence suppression as a fraud on the court claim after 
discovering the additional proof of the evidence suppression.  The 
better approach, however, is to treat the fraud on the court claim as a 
new claim because it asserts something new.  Instead of merely 
reasserting the claim that the prosecutor withheld evidence, the 
habeas petitioner’s fraud on the court claim is based on the lie the 
prosecutor told about withholding evidence in the habeas proceeding.286  Thus, 
the § 2244 restriction on previously brought claims does not impair 
the fraud on the court power in a way that prevents the full exercise 
of judicial power, if courts appropriately treat fraud on the habeas 
court claims as new claims. 
Even if fraud on the court claims are treated as new claims, § 
2244 places additional significant restrictions on fraud on the court 
claims.287  Pursuant to the statute, a court must dismiss a claim in a 
successive habeas petition unless (1) the claim relies on “a new rule 
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court,” or (2) the claim is based on “new facts showing a 
high probability of actual innocence.”288  The first exception will rarely, if 
ever, allow a fraud on the court claim subject to § 2244 to go forward.  
The second exception seems to fit the prosecutorial misconduct 
 
 285  See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006); Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 789 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
 286  An appropriately narrow reading of Gonzalez would support this result.  See 
Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 (post-judgment relief claims going to the integrity of the 
habeas proceedings are not subject to § 2244’s bar on successive habeas applications). 
 287  Section 2244 applies to habeas applications filed by state prisoners.  § 
2244(b)(1).  But federal prisoners are also subject to restrictions on successive 
habeas applications or “motions” that are similar to those applied to state prisoners.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006) (prescribing that second or successive motion must 
be certified to court of appeals and meet strict requirements to proceed). 
 288  Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529–30 (emphasis added). 
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hypothetical above, but the actual language of the exception makes 
clear that it requires a more onerous showing, equivalent to a high 
probability of actual innocence, to obtain relief: 
A claim . . . shall be dismissed unless . . . 
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have 
been discovered previously through the exercise of due 
diligence; and 
(B)(ii)the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed 
in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have 
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.289 
Section 2244’s requirement that a fraud on the habeas court 
claimant establish the newly discovered evidence exception by clear 
and convincing evidence does not prevent the full exercise of judicial 
power.  Post-judgment relief claimants have always faced the 
requirement to prove fraud on the court by clear and convincing 
evidence.290  And despite the increased burden of proof, the habeas 
court that has been defrauded retains its power to vacate a judgment 
procured by fraud, albeit only after a more onerous showing by the 
person seeking relief.291  And while some judgments may not be 
subject to reopening where the proof of fraud is something less than 
clear and convincing, the statute allows the court to remedy the most 
egregious frauds, preserving the courts’ institutional prerogatives in 
addition to allowing the full exercise of judicial power. 
AEDPA § 2244’s one-year statute of limitations on newly 
discovered evidence claims, however, does prevent the full exercise of 
 
 289  § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 290  Fraud on the court has traditionally been viewed as an injury to the court 
itself, depriving the court of the ability to exercise the judicial function.  See Hazel-
Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 235, 246 (1944).  Thus, fraud that 
does not benefit an adverse party, the state in § 2244 cases, may still be actionable as 
a fraud on the court because the court suffers the injury.  See Southerland v. Cnty. of 
Oakland, 77 F.R.D. 727, 732–33 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (holding that fraud that 
benefitted court officer, not party, was actionable).  It follows that fraud on the court 
may be actionable even if the fraud did prevent the presentation of an actual 
innocence claim.  For instance, fraud on the court in the sentencing context would 
not deprive the guilty prisoner of facts tending to prove actual innocence but would 
possibly deprive her of facts that could mitigate her sentence.  Cf. Unthank v. Jett, 
549 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Section 2244 barred successive 
petition where new fact that would result in lower sentence was not a new fact 
showing high probability of actual innocence).  To the extent that § 2244 bars such a 
claim, it is a material impairment on the court’s fraud on the court power. 
 291  See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529–30 (2005) (stating that § 2244 requires new facts 
demonstrating a “high probability of actual innocence”). 
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judicial power in some circumstances.  When fraud on the court 
claims are treated as successive habeas petitions, they are subject to § 
2244’s one-year filing time limit, even if the claim meets one of the § 
2244 exceptions (i.e. new rule of constitutional law or newly 
discovered evidence).292  The statute provides that “[a] 1-year period 
of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus” 
in actions involving state prisoners.293  The one-year time limit begins 
to run from the occurrence of several triggers, including “the date on 
which the factual predicate of the claim or claims could have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”294  Historically, the 
power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court has been subject to 
no time limit, not even laches.  The lack of a time limit for filing 
fraud on the court claims exists for good reason.295 
Imposing a statute of limitations on the fraud on the court 
power in the habeas context subjugates the practical existence of the 
power to the filing decisions of inmates.296  If an inmate files a fraud 
on the court claim more than one year after the § 2244 triggers, the 
court never has the opportunity to pass on the claim because its 
corrupt officers prevented the exercise of judicial power in the first 
instance and an inmate’s (or other litigant’s) lack of filing diligence 
prevents review of the claim the second time.297  In many cases, claims 
for fraud on the habeas court would be entirely beyond the reach of 
Article III courts despite being meritorious.  Thus, § 2244 as currently 
drafted prevents the full exercise of judicial power and, as a result, is 
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power. 
 
 292  See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006). 
 293  § 2244(d)(1).   
 294  § 2244(d)(1)(D).   
 295  See, e.g., Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 521–22, 525 
(3d Cir. 1948) (“[F]reedom from fraud may always be the subject of further judicial 
inquiry.”).  
 296  Cf. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) 
(noting that the critical, systemic importance of vacating judgments procured 
through corruption of court officers extends beyond the interests of litigants). 
 297  The requirement that the fraud on the habeas court claimant act diligently 
suffers from the same infirmity as the one-year limitation.  Fraud on the court is an 
injury to the judiciary itself, in addition to any individual litigant.  Thus, a 
requirement that the individual litigant act diligently to discover fraud on the habeas 
court vests a court prerogative in the hands of an inmate.  In some instances, this 
would prevent the full exercise of judicial power. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Limits on Congress’s ability to regulate or eliminate the 
independent, or inherent, powers of the judiciary are essential to 
preserving independent courts.  At the same time, if courts take too 
broad a view of their independent power, the prerogatives of the 
other two branches are in peril.  The balance between some 
independent power and too much is undoubtedly a fine one.  But the 
question of whether a particular independent court power is beyond 
the purview of Congress should always turn on the essentiality of that 
power to the function and nature of the irreducible part of Article III 
judicial power.  A careful analysis of the necessity of some 
traditionally inherent powers reveals that they are subject to revision 
or elimination by Congress.  Other inherent judicial powers are, in 
many senses, beyond Congress’s reach.  In the case of the circuit 
courts’ implementation of AEDPA to restrict lower courts’ use of the 
power to vacate their own judgments for fraud on the court, Congress 
has overstepped.  While one congressional intrusion might not be 
Constitution shattering, it does portend a view of congressional 
power that could intrude into other essential independent powers.  
And in the meantime, Congress has left significant, result-altering 
fraud by court officers and attorneys, potentially including fraud in 
death penalty cases, beyond the reach of federal courts in some 
instances.  Separation of powers concerns and the more practical 
matter of integrity and justice in the most serious cases demand that 
Congress and the courts revisit the current untenable 
implementation of AEDPA in fraud on the court actions.  Judicial 
independence and lives hang in the balance. 
 
